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Abstract
On June 9, 2009, a controversial and longstanding North American Free Trade Agreement
(”NAFTA”) arbitration was resolved in favor of the United States. Overviews of the dispute and
NAFTA investor-state arbitrations are set forth in Parts I and II, respectively. Part III explains
that the process employed was commendably transparent, especially in accommodating tribal in-
terests, and should serve as a model for future proceedings. The award positively advances two
international legal protections: regulatory takings and “fair and equitable treatment.” Although the
takings analysis described in Part IV confirms that NAFTA claimants have procedural advantages
over domestic litigants, its pro-government framework goes beyond the U.S. law from which it de-
rives to maximize the ability to regulate and should be adopted worldwide. The ”fair and equitable
treatment” analysis, detailed in Part V, sophistically equates modern-day customary international
law with the standard articulated in 1926 and confusingly incorporates regulatory takings concepts.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 9, 2009, a controversial and longstanding North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") arbitration was
resolved in favor of the United States. The arbitral tribunal
constituted under chapter 11 of NAFTA unanimously rejected
both claims by a Canadian investor frustrated in its efforts to
mine a portion of the California desert that Native Americans
hold sacred.' Overviews of the dispute and NAFTA investor-state
arbitration are set forth in Parts I and II, respectively. Part III
explains that the process employed was commendably
transparent, especially in accommodating tribal interests, and
should serve as a model for future proceedings. The award
positively advances two international legal protections: regulatory
takings and "fair and equitable treatment." Although the takings
analysis described in Part IV confirms that NAFTA claimants have
procedural advantages over domestic litigants, its pro-
government framework goes beyond the U.S. law from which it
derives to maximize the ability to regulate and should be adopted
worldwide. The "fair and equitable treatment" analysis, detailed
in Part V, sophistically equates modern-day customary
international law with the standard articulated in 1926 and
confusingly incorporates regulatory takings concepts. However,
this reasoning facilitates foreign direct investment by recognizing
customary norms when states become liable. Investors now have
greater certainty as to the circumstances when they will have
* Law Clerk,Judge EvanJ. Wallach, 2008-2010, U.S. Court of International Trade;
LL.M., International Legal Studies, New York University School of Law, 2008; Assistant
Counsel, 1999-2007, Tahoe Regional Planning Agency; J.D., University of Colorado
School of Law, 1998; B.S., Political Economy of Natural Resources, University of
California at Berkeley, 1994.
1. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2009),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf.
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recourse for conduct by their host government. Glamis Gold Ltd.
v. United States is the gold standard for investor-state arbitration.
I. THE DISPUTE2
Glamis focuses on a stretch of the California desert known as
Indian Pass.3 This land is located west of the Colorado River and
near the Quechan Tribe reservation; tribal members return there
"to practice their cultural and religious traditions" as they have
since time immemorial.4 In the late 1980s, 5 the publicly held
Canadian corporation Glamis Gold Ltd., through its Nevadan
subsidiary,6 acquired rights to mine in the vicinity of Indian Pass. 7
These rights were obtained through the General Mining Act of
1872 that allows U.S. citizens to mine federal lands without
having to pay royalties.8  The Federal Land Policy and
Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA") 9 "amends and supersedes"
the Mining Act of 1872 by directing the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of the Interior ("DOI") to protect against
environmental harm. 10 FLPMA designates a California Desert
Conservation Area ("CDCA"),"1 within which projects must not
create "undue impairment"; 2 this term is undefined. 13 Indian
2. This part provides only the information necessary to understand the award; for a
thorough account, see Jordan C. Kahn, A Golden Opportunity for NAFTA, 16 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 380, 381-403 (2008).
3. See Glamis, Award, 1 31-52.
4. Counter-Memorial of Respondent United States of America, Glamis, at 41-47,
(Sept. 19, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 7 3686.pdf
[hereinafter Counter-Memorial of Respondent]; see also Kahn, supra note 2, at 389.
5. See Glamis, Award, 32; see also Kahn, supra note 2, at 390-91.
6. See Glamis, Award, 27-29; see also Kahn, supra note 2, at 390 n.55. For simplicity,
this Article uses "Glamis" to refer collectively to the Canadian corporation Glamis Gold
Ltd., its U.S. subsidiary Glamis Imperial, and the Canadian company Goldcorp Inc.,
which acquired Glamis Gold Ltd. in 2006 while this arbitration was ongoing.
7. See Glamis, Award, 1 52. Glamis's right to the land was not basis of the dispute.
Id. 1 15 ("It is not contested in this proceeding that Glamis still formally possesses its
federally granted mining right. Glamis claims that, although it is still in possession of this
right as a formal matter, the value of the right was so diminished by governmental action
that it was expropriated in fact.").
8. General Mining Act of 1872 § 1, 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2006); see also Glamis, Award, 9
36; Kahn, supra note 2, at 381-82, 388.
9. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-87 (West
2007 & Supp. 2009).
10. Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2003); see also
Glamis, Award, 1 43 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006)).
11. See Glamis, Award, 144 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1781(a)(1)-(3)).
12. 43 U.S.C. § 1781(f) (2006).
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Pass is located in the CDCA and portions of it are designated as
wilderness by another federal law, the California Desert
Protection Act of 1994 ("CDPA"). 14
In 1994, Glamis applied to extract gold from within one
mile of Indian Pass.1 5 Its "Imperial Project" was proposed on
1631 acres of federal land east of San Diego, within the CDCA16
but outside of a CDPA wilderness area.' 7 Glamis's Plan of
Operations ("POO") described the excavation of 150 million
tons of ore and 300 million tons of waste rock from three open
pits,18 using the inefficient and deleterious cyanide heap leach
process. 9 Glamis proposed to "completely backfill" two of the
three pits-restoring them to their original contours after
mining-while "the third pit would be partially backfilled" and
thereby remain scarred. 20 The Imperial Project required permits
from both the DOI under FLPMA, 21 and California under the
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1975 ("SMARA"). 22
SMARA mandates the "reclamation" of mining sites through
means that "may require backfilling" 23 and directs the State
Mining and Geology Board ("SMGB") to adopt necessary
regulations. 24 Before either the federal or California permits
could issue, both governments must conduct environmental
review under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
13. See Glamis, Award, 1 635. Glamis argued throughout the case that the "undue
impairment" standard equated with the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1972 ("FLPMA") "unnecessary or undue degradation" standard that is defined as that of
a "prudent operator." See id. 9 57, 635, 638; see also 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (stating the
"unnecessary or undue degradation" standard); 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (2000) (stating
the "prudent operator" standard). By contrast, the United States maintained "that the
'undue impairment' and 'unnecessary or undue degradation' standards were never
viewed as equivalent." Glamis, Award, 655.
14. See Glamis, Award, 67; California Desert Protection Act (CDPA) of 1994, 16
U.S.C. §§ 410aaa--410aaa-83 (2006).
15. See Glamis, Award, 9 52, 95. Prior to submitting its application, Glamis stated
that "it spent nearly [US]$2 million on the Imperial Project, with most of these costs
incurred on the acquisition of the mining claims and the early exploration drilling
program." Id. 88.
16. See id. 931.
17. Id. 1 66-67; see also Kahn, supra note 2, at 391, 447 n.400.
18. See Glamis, Award, 911 33, 86.
19. See id. 91 33 n.57; see also Kahn, supra note 2, at 391-92.
20. Id. 34.
21. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2006).
22. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 2770 (West 2006); Glamis, Award, 74.
23. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 2733 (West 2006).
24. Id. § 2755; Glamis 975.
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("NEPA")25 and the California Environmental Quality Act of
1970("CEQA"),26 respectively. These laws require the study and
disclosure of significant adverse impacts through means that
include consideration of alternatives and public hearings. 27
Evaluation of cultural impacts factored prominently in the
environmental review of the Imperial Project.28 The NEPA and
CEQA processes intersect with other laws that protect Native
American resources, 29  including the National Historical
Preservation Act ("NHPA"). 30 NHPA-mandated meetings with
tribal members at the site disclosed that the PO would create
significant unmitigated adverse cultural impacts. 31 The Quechan
25. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006);
Glamis, Award, 1 56.
26. California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-
06 (West 2006).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (requiring an environmental impact statement for
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment");
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(d) (requiring an environmental impact report if there is
"substantial evidence ... that the project may have a significant effect on the
environment"); seealso40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1-.4 (2008); Glamis77 63-64, 11 69-70,7 102.
28. Kahn, supra note 2, at 393.
29. See Glamis 11 79-82; Kahn, supra note 2, at 386-87. The California Native
American Historical, Cultural and Sacred Sites Act of 1976 mandates that:
No private party using or occupying private property ... shall in any manner
whatsoever ... cause severe or irreparable damage to any Native American
sanctified cemetery, place of worship, religious or ceremonial site, or sacred
shrine located on public property, except on a clear and convincing showing
that the public interest and necessity so require.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5097.9 (West 2006).
30. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 directs the Interior Secretary
"to expand and maintain a National Register of Historic Places," which includes areas
significant in Native American history, archaeology, and culture. See 16 U.S.C. §
470a(a) (1) (A) (2006). The law further establishes an Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation ("ACHP") to serve as the federal liaison with "any Indian Tribe ... that
attaches religious and cultural significance to properties ... determined to be eligible
for inclusion on the National Register." Id. § 470a(d) (6) (A)-(B), 470i; see Glamis, Award,
11 76-78. The Imperial Project site was potentially eligible for inclusion on the National
Register. See Glamis, Award, 11 92, 108.
31. The ACHP rendered this conclusion. See Glamis, Award, 1 119-27; Record of
Decision for the Imperial Project Gold Mine Proposal, BLM Case File No. CA 670-41027,
at 12 (Jan. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Record of Decision], available at http://www.blm.gov/
ca/pdfs/elcentropdfs/Glamis RODfinall-01.pdf (concluding that the "mitigation
measures would 'do little to reduce the devastating impacts on historical properties and
their environmental and fall short of compensating for the loss of traditional, religious,
and cultural values'" (quoting app. A, Letter from Cathryn Buford Slater, Chairman,
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, to Bruce Babbitt, Sec'y of the Interior 3 (Oct.
19, 1999))); see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, M-36999,
REGUALTION OF HARDROCK MINING 2-3 (1999), http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/
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Tribe expressed great concern that the Imperial Project "would
destroy the Trail of Dreams"Z2-a sacred area historically that is
presently used by tribe members. 33 During a meeting with DOI
officials,3 4  the "Quechan Tribal Historian described the
importance of the area to the Quechan people's cultural
resources and religious values; he likened the religious
significance of the area to 'Jerusalem or Mecca."' 35 Being
confronted with Mining Act of 1872 rights and identified adverse
impacts to cultural resources, DOI staff was unsure of its
"decision-making parameters and legal responsibilities"3 6 and
turned to the DOI Solicitor for guidance.37
DOI Solicitor John Leshy provided the legal authority to
deny Glamis's application. His December 1999 legal opinion
("Leshy Opinion") concluded that DOI could deny the POO
based on significant adverse cultural impacts pursuant to the
undue impairment standard in FLMPA.38
opinions/M-36999, Regulation of Hardrock Mining-1999.pdf [hereinafter Leshy
Opinion], reprinted in Record of Decision, supra, app. B ("'If implemented, the
[Imperial Project] would be so damaging to historic resources that the Quechan Tribe's
ability to practice their sacred traditions as a living part of their community life and
development would be lost. Overall, the [ACHP] is convinced that the cumulative
impacts of the proposed mine ... even with the mitigation measures proposed by the
company, would result in a serious and irreparable degradation of the sacred and
historic values of the [land] that sustains the tribe. Therefore the [ACHP] concludes
that the Glamis Imperial Project would effectively destroy the historic resources in the
project area, and recommends that Interior take whatever legal means available to deny
approval for the project."' (quoting Letter from Cathryn Buford Slater to Bruce Babbitt,
supra, at 3, reprinted in Record of Decision, supra, app. A.)).
32. Glamis, Award, 107.
33. See id. 9 103, 105.
34. The Bureau of Land Management is the agency within the U.S. Department of
the Interior ("DOI") that processed the Imperial Project application submitted by
Glamis on behalf of the federal government. See Mineral Pol'y Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F.
Supp. 2d 30,32 n.2 (D.D.C. 2003); Glamis, Award, 9 96..
35. Glamis, Award, I 111 (citation omitted).
36. Counter-Memorial of Respondent, supra note 4, at 81 (quoting Memorandum
from Ed Hastey, State Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt., toJohn Leshy, Solicitor, DOI (Jan. 5,
1998)).
37. Glamis, Award, 114 (citing Memorandum from Ed Hastey to John Leshy,
supra note 36, at 1).
38. See Leshy Opinion, supra note 31, at 19, reprinted in Record of Decision, supra
note 31, app. B; see also Glamis, Award, 99 144-45. The Leshy Opinion is formally
referred to as the "M-Opinion." See id. 9 140.
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In April 2000, Glamis initiated litigation challenging the
Leshy Opinion. 39 The following October, the district court
preliminarily dismissed the lawsuit because DOI had not yet
rendered a decision about the Imperial Project.40 Under U.S. law,
a challenge against government must "ripen" through final
agency action, before it may be heard in federal court.41 The
district court criticized Glamis's premature and "impermissible
judicial interference in an ongoing administrative process." 42
Glamis was required to await final agency action on its Imperial
Project application, which occurred in January 2001 when DOI
denied the permit based on the Leshy Opinion.43 Secretary of the
Interior Bruce Babbitt explained that the site was "within a
Native American 'spiritual pathway' . .. and ... that tribal
members believed the proposed mine would 'impair the ability to
travel, both physically and spiritually' along [the] 'Trail of
Dreams.' "'44
In March 2001, Glamis once again sued the federal
government, this time with a final agency action and therefore a
ripe challenge. 45 However, upon persuading the administration
of President George W. Bush to rescind the permit denial,
Glamis withdrew its case. 46 After meetings between Glamis and
new DOI officials, DOI Secretary Gale Norton rescinded the
denial in November 2001.47 This DOI action was criticized for
39. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Glamis Imperial Corp. v.
Babbit, No. 00-0196 (D. Nev. Apr. 13, 2000); see also Glamis, Award, 146; Counter-
Memorial of Respondent, supra note 4, at 83.
40. See Glamis Imperial Corp. v. Babbit (Glamis 1), No. 00-cv-1934 (S.D. Cal. Oct.
31, 2000); see also Glamis, Award, 147; Counter-Memorial of Respondent, Glamis, at 84.
41. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620-21 (2001); Williamson County
Reg'I Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985);
see also infra Parts IV.A-B.
42. Glamis I, No. 00-cv-1934, slip. op. at 7.
43. See Record of Decision, supra note 31, at 3-4; see also Glamis, Award, 99 153-55.
44. Memorial of Claimant Glamis Gold Ltd., Glamis, 182 (May 5, 2006) [hereinafter
Memorial of Claimant] (quoting Record of Decision, supra note 31, at 10).
45. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Glamis Imperial Corp. v.
U.S. Dep't of the Interior (Glamis I1), No. 01-cv-00530 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2001); see also
Glamis, Award, 9 156; Kahn, supra note 2, at 398.
46. See Glamis II, No. 01-cv-00530 (Dec. 18, 2001); see also Counter-Memorial of
Respondent, supra note 4, at 86.
47. See Glamis, Award, 159 (citing Gale A. Norton, Sec'y of the Interior,
Rescission of Record of Decision for the Imperial Project Gold Mine Proposal (Nov. 23,
2001)). This rescission was based on an opinion from the new DOI Solicitor that
disagreed with the interpretation of the FLMPA in the Leshy Opinion. See Glamis,
STRIKING NAFTA GOLD
lacking "transparency" because it occurred after DOI and the
applicant met privately and without the participation of other
interested groups; U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer stated that
"[a] lthough the initial permit denial took 6 years and hundreds
of hours of consultation, the decision to reopen the permit
involved no public input and took only a few months." 48
Following the rescission, the federal government began moving
towards authorizing the Imperial Project.49
With the federal permit ready to issue, the government of
California, the "Golden State," 50 sprang into action.51 Pursuant to
SMARA, SMGB introduced emergency regulations on December
12, 2002.52 These became permanent in April 2003, 53 requiring
complete backfilling for all open-pit metallic mines in California,
including Glamis's proposed Imperial Project.54 That same
Award, 157-58; see also U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, M-
37007, SURFACE MANAGEMENT PROVISIONS FOR HARDROCK MINING 8-13 (Oct. 23, 2001),
http://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opinions/
M-37007, Surface Management Provisions for Hardrock Mining-2001.pdf. Solicitor
Myers's FLPMA interpretation was subsequently rejected by a reviewing court. See
Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 41-44 (D.D.C. 2003).
48. See The Protection of Native American Sacred Places As They Are Affected By
Department of Defense Undertakings: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 107th
Cong. 2-5 (2002) (statement of Sen. Boxer, Member, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs).
49. See Glamis, Award, 163, 165; Kahn, supra note 2, at 398-99.
50. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 420.75 (West 2006).
51. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 387, 401-03; see also Glamis, Award, 175. The body
responsible for introducing these measures acted under the urgency of Glamis's
Imperial project:
"These changes to statute are urgently needed to stop the Glamis Imperial
mining project in Imperial county proposed by Glamis Gold, Ltd., a Canadian-
based company. The project is a massive, open-pit, cyanide heap-leach gold
mine on 1,500 acres of public land that would destroy sacred sites of critical
religious and cultural importance to the Quechan Indian Tribe...."
Id. 1 176 (quoting S. NATURAL RES & WILDLIFE COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, S.B. 22, at 4-5
(Jan. 10, 2003), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_0001-0050/
sb 22 cfa 20030110_115605_sen comm.html).
52. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14 § 3704.1 (2003), 14 CA ADC s 3704.1 (Westlaw); see
also Glamis, Award, 181.
53. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14 § 3704.1, history 3, 14 CA ADC s 3704.1 (Westlaw);
see also Glamis, Award, 1 184; Kahn, supra note 2, at 401.
54. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14 § 3704.1(a), 14 CA ADC s 3704.1 (Westlaw). The
regulation specifically provides that all metallic minerals must be "backfilled to achieve
not less than the original surface elevation" and cannot "exceed in height the pre-
mining surface contour elevation by more than 25 feet." Id. § 3704.1(a), (e). Although
these regulations have both a "grandfather clause," see id. § 3704.1(i), 14 CA ADC s
3704.1 (Westlaw); Kahn, supra note 2, at 401 n.135, and a "variance" process, see CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 3704.1(h), 14 CA ADC s 3704.1 (Westlaw); Kahn, supra note 2, at
20091
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month, California passed Senate Bill 22 ("SB 22"), which amends
SMARA to require complete backfilling for mining projects
located within "one mile of any Native American sacred site." 55 In
signing the SMARA amendment, California Governor Gray Davis
announced that the "measure sends a message that California's
sacred sites are more precious than gold."56 While the SMARA
amendment and SMGB regulations (collectively the "California
measures") were being enacted, Glamis requested that DOI
suspend the permitting process for the POO.57 Glamis attempted
to negotiate a buyout through which the federal government
would purchase and acquire its property interests, although these
efforts were not successful. 58
In July 2003, Glamis filed a NAFTA chapter 11 arbitration
claim against the United States. 59 Glamis asserted that DOI and
California "have, through a series of measures, failed to approve
the plan of operation and erected barriers that have effectively
destroyed all economic value of Glamis Imperial's established
mineral rights." 60 Acknowledging DOI's "steps to reverse" the
alleged wrongdoing, Glamis contended that the federal
government has "to date still has not approved" its proposal or
compensated "for the loss of its investment." 61 According to
Glamis, the "discriminatory and expropriatory ... backfilling
mandates ... completely destroy the economic value of [its]
401 n.135, neither applied to the Imperial Project. See id. California regulations apply to
federal mining claims because states may impose "a higher standard of protection for
public lands" under the Mining Act of 1872. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.3 (2008); see 30 U.S.C. § 26
(2006); Cal. Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 589 (1987).
55. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 2773.3(a) (West 2006); 2003 Cal. Stat. ch. 3, at 1;
Counter-Memorial of Respondent, supra note 4, at 95.
56. Press Release, Office of the Governor of the State of Cal., Governor Davis Signs
Legislation to Stop Proposed Gold Mine Near "Trail of Dreams" Sacred Site 4/7/2003
(Apr. 7, 2003), http://www.gray davis.com/viewlibraryitem.aspx?id=3892.
57. Glamis, Award, 164. Glamis requested that DOI suspend the permitting
process on December 9, 2002. See id. The government responded on January 7, 2003,
that it would suspend processing if Glamis waived any legal liability from the suspension.
See id. Glamis replied in March 2003 by informing DOI "that it would not reconfirm its
suspension request." Id.
58. See id. 164 & n.487.
59. See Notice of Arbitration Under the Rules of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law and the North America Free Trade Agreement, Glamis, at 7
(Dec. 10 2003) [hereinafter Notice of Arbitration].
60. Id.
61. Id.
2009] STRIKING NAFFA GOLD
significant investment."62 Glamis requested "not less than US$50
million in compensation" and also costs, fees, and interest.63
II. NAFTA ARTICLES 1110 AND 1105JURISPRUDENCE
NAFTA came into force in 1994 between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico. 64 Chapter 11 of NAFTA allows claimant
investors from one NAFTA state to arbitrate alleged violations of
rights protected by NAFTA directly against another NAFTA state
hosting the investment. 6 These proceedings employ rules from
either the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law ("UNCITRAL") or the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). 66 Respondent states are
responsible for actions of their political subdivisions that violate
investor rights.67 Among the guarantees in chapter 11 of NAFTA
is article 1110, which protects against expropriation, including
indirect expropriation or a "regulatory taking," by mandating
compensation in the form of fair market value. 68 Article 1110 is
62. Id. at 10.
63. Id. at 11.
64. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. See generally RALPH FOLSOM, NAFTA AND
FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2008). The mechanics of the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") are beyond the scope of this Article, as is
an assessment of NAFTA's utility.
65. NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1117(1) ("An investor of a Party, on behalf of an
enterprise of another Party that is ajuridicial person that the investor owns or controls
directly or indirectly, may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that the other
Party has breached an obligation.").
66. Id. art. 1120(1)(a)-(c); see also ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAw 570-71 (2d ed. 2008). Glamis employed the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules, although the
proceedings were administered by the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award, 187,
196 (NAYTA Arb. Trib. 2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
125798.pdf.
67. NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 105; see also Glamis, Award, 30.
68. See NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1110; Glamis, Award, 356 ("This proceeding
involves the particularly thorny issue of what is commonly known as a regulatory
taking."). NAFTA article 1110 reads in relevant part:
Article 1110: Expropriation and Compensation
1. No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"),
except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
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strikingly similar to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. 69
Another common investor protection is the guarantee in
NAFTA article 1105(1) of "fair and equitable treatment." Article
1105 is captioned as the "Minimum Standard of Treatment" and
is explicitly tied to international law by providing: "Each Party
shall accord to investments of investors of another Party
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair
and equitable treatment.... "70 This right is analogous to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, 71 although the remedy differs because tribunals can
only award damages and cannot invalidate government action. 72
Tribunals finding violations of article 1105 have wide discretion
in awarding damages. 73
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation ....
2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place
("date of expropriation") ....
NAFIA, supra note 64, art. 1110.
This protection is contained in each of the more than two thousand bilateral
investment treaties ("BITs") in force around the world, in addition to NAFTA chapter
11. LOWENFELD, supra note 66, at 554, 559.
69. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 412-13 (the "public purpose" requirement is directly
lifted from the Fifth Amendment and the "fair market value" requirement from its
jurisprudence).
70. NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1105(1).
71. SeeJohn D. Echeverria, The Real Contract on America, ENVTL. F.,July-Aug. 2003,
at 33 (calling NAFTA article 1105 an "international equivalent of the Due Process
Clause").
72. See BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA: A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 152 (1994).
73. See S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1443 (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. 2000), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/
myersvcanadapartialaward-final_13-11-00.pdf ("By not identifying any particular
methodology for the assessment of compensation in cases not involving expropriation,
the Tribunal considers that the drafters of the NAFIA intended to leave it open to
tribunals to determine a measure of compensation appropriate to the specific
circumstances of the case, taking into account the principles of both international law
and the provisions of the NAFTA. In some ... cases, a tribunal might think.., that the
application of the fair market value standard is not a logical, appropriate or practicable
measure of the compensation to be awarded.").
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More than a decade of NAFTA investor-state arbitration has
produced considerable jurisprudence.7 4 Although chapter 11
dictates that each proceeding stands alone, 75 the awards provide
important guidance for tribunals and parties in subsequent
proceedings. 76 Every "NAFTA tribunal, while recognizing that
there is no precedential effect given to previous decisions, should
communicate its reasons for departing from major trends present
in previous decisions. ' 77 Despite the "case-specific mandate" of
each NAFTA tribunal, 78 awards are rendered "with sensitivity to
the position of future tribunals and an awareness of other
systemic implications." 79 The resultant de facto reconciliation of
previous awards under NAFTA is demonstrated by the interplay
between two prominent chapter 11 arbitrations: the 2000
74. For an overview of articles 1110 and 1105 jurisprudence before Glamis, see
LOWENFELD, supra note 66, at 556-63, 567-68; Kahn, supra note 2, at 411-37.
75. NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1136(1) ("An award made by a Tribunal shall have
no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular
case."). The tribunal in Glamis concisely explained this principle:
The Tribunal sees its mandate under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA as similar to
the case-specific mandate ordinarily found in international commercial
arbitration.... An arbitral tribunal is not confronted with the task of
reconciling its later decisions with its earlier ones. Notwithstanding the
likelihood that numerous arbitrations would arise under Chapter 11 of the
NAFTA, the three states of North America did not establish a standing
adjudicative body but rather chose to have arbitrations resolved by distinct
arbitral panels.
Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award, 3 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2009),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf.
76. See Glamis, Award, 8 n.7 ("Given that there is no precedent, a tribunal may
depart from even major previous trends. Unlike institutions with a closed docket of cases
where consistency between the various claimants is often of paramount importance, the
NAFTA regime's effort at consistency is one that both looks backward to major trends in
past decided disputes and forward towards disputes that have not yet arisen. The appeal
process (in the sense that it corrects a statement of the law) in arbitration runs forward
in time over several cases rather than upwards in one particular case until a supreme
judicial authority settles a question for a time. It is for these reasons that as a tribunal
departs from past trends, it should indicate the reasons for doing so."). Id.
77. Id. 8.
78. Id. 3; see supra note 75 and accompanying text.
79. Glamis, Award, 6. Glamis explains that "[t]he ultimate integrity of the Chapter
11 system as a whole requires a modicum of awareness of each of these tribunals for the
system as a whole." Id. 5. However, the tribunal "in no way views its awareness of the
context in which it operates as justifying (or indeed requiring) a departure from its duty
to focus on the specific case before it." Id. 9.
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Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico ° and the 2005 Methanex Corp. v. United
States.81
The Metalclad claimant was a California corporation that in
1993 purchased property in Mexico to operate a landfill.82 That
year the federal government granted a permit.8 3 However,
subsequent actions by political subdivisions stopped the project:
the municipality in 1995 denied a permit,8 4 and the province in
1997 issued an ecological decree that "effectively and
permanently precluded operation of the landfill."85  The
Metalclad tribunal determined that these actions constituted an
indirect expropriation pursuant to article 1110, and a violation of
the guarantee of "fair and equitable treatment" in article 1105.86
The claimant was awarded more than US$16 million, the amount
of its investment.8 7 Metalclad sparked a perception that NAFTA
chapter 11 casts a "chilling effect on regulators" and serves "as a
weapon by some multinational corporations against
environmental protection."88
Five years after Metalclad, Methanex eased environmentalists'
fears.8 9 There the tribunal upheld California's prohibition of the
80. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, 40 I.L.M. 36 (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. 2000), available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp-pages/importa/
sol contro/consultoria/casos_mexico/metalclad/laudo/laudo-ingles.pdf.
81. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf.
82. See Metalclad, Award, 30, 35.
83. See id. 35.
84. See id. 50.
85. Id. 59.
86. See id. 101, 112; see also LOWENFELD, supra note 66, at 557, 559-60.
87. See Metalclad, Award, 131; see also LOWENFELD, supra note 66, at 566.
88. Paul Stanton Kibel & Jonathan R. Shultz, Rio Grande Designs: Texans' NAFTA
Water Claims Against Mexico, 25 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 228, 247 (2007) (quoting Gustavo
Alanis-Ortega, Citizen Panel Sees Faults and Suggests Reform, ENVTL. F., July-Aug. 2003, at
34, 38); see also Echeverria, supra note 71; Lauren Godhsall, Note, In the Cold Shadow of
Metalclad: The Potential for Change to NAFTA's Chapter Eleven, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 264
(2002).
89. Despite being eased, environmentalists' concerns over NAFTA chapter 11
remain after Methanex and Glamis. See Rossella Brevetti, NAFTA Arbitration Panel Rejects
Claim By Canadian Mining Firm Under Chapter 11, 26 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 826 (June
18, 2009) ("Earthjustice, Earthworks, Public Citizen and Sierra Club said June 9 that the
dismissal of the Canadian firm's claim does not remedy the serious problem of NAFTA
providing foreign investors special rights to attack domestic health and environmental
laws. Further, the groups cautioned that four other NAFTA challenges are pending
against the United States in which foreign investors are demanding more than [US]$6
billion....").
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gasoline additive methyl tertiary butyl ether, a suspected
carcinogen, in a challenge brought by a Canadian manufacturer
of the prime ingredient of the additive, methanol.90 Although
this ban devalued the claimant's investment and benefitted
competing ethanol manufacturers, it did not violate NAFTA. In
rejecting the article 1110 claim, the Methanex tribunal
emphasized the absence of assurances against regulatory change:
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-
discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is
enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects,
inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed
expropriatory and compensable unless specific commitments
had been given by the regulating government to the then
putative foreign investor contemplating investment that the
government would refrain from such regulation.
No such commitments were given to Methanex....
... Hence this ... is not [a case] where specific
commitments respecting restraints on certain future
regulatory actions were made to induce investors to enter a
market and then those commitments were not honoured.91
This standard employed by Methanex is referred to in
shorthand as "specific assurances." 92 NAFTA tribunals use this
standard to distinguish Metaiclad, as shown by these passages
from a 2002 award denying compensation under article 1110:
Metalclad had relied on the representations of the Mexican
federal government of its exclusive authority to issue permits
for hazardous waste disposal facilities....
... The assurances received by the investor from the
Mexican government in Metalclad were definitive,
unambiguous and repeated, in stating that the federal
90. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, 44 I.L.M. 1345, pt.IV, ch. F,
4 5-6 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/51052.pdf.
91. Id., pt. IV ch. D 4 7, 9-10.
92. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 425 (citing Methanex, pt. IV ch. D 4 7, 9-10).
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government had the authority to authorize construction and
operation of hazardous waste landfills.93
NAFTA jurisprudence in this way has developed to find
states liable if they renege upon "specific assurances" given to
prospective investors. 94 This standard allows for Metalclad to
remain intact albeit minimizing its application to a particular
circumstance. 95 Metalclad is the only NAFTA investor-state
arbitration that found an article 1110 violation, 96 although three
subsequent tribunals likewise found violations of article 1105.97
Investors have had much greater success challenging "fair and
equitable treatment" than takings under NAFTA. 98
The content of NAFTA's "fair and equitable treatment"
guarantee is the subject of intense debate.99 In November 2000,
an award decision alarmingly interpreted article 1105 as "additive
to the requirements of international law. That is, investors under
NAIFTA are entitled to the international law minimum plus the
fairness elements."1 00 This reasoning prompted the United
States, Canada, and Mexico to act collectively through the Free
Trade Commission ("FTC"). 10 1 In July 2001, FTC issued an
interpretation-which chapter 11 makes expressly binding on
93. Feldman v. United Mexican States, Award, 42 I.L.M. 625, 146, 148, (NAFFA
Arb. Trib. 2002), available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp-pages/importa/
sol-contro/consultoria/casos mexico/marvin/laudo/laudojingles.pdf.
94. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 425-28, 447-48.
95. See id. at 425.
96. SeeJack Coe, Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch
of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1401 (2003).
97. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Award, 42 I.L.M. 811, 137 (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf
(reasoning that the statements concerning the article 1105 violation constituted dicta
because the challenge was dismissed on procedural grounds); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Canada, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 148, 1 195 (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. 2001), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/award_merits-e.pdf; S.D. Myers,
Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 268 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000), available
at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/
myersvcanadapartialaward final_13-11-00.pdf.
98. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 432.
99. See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, Award, 538 (NAFTA Arb. Trib.
2009), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf ("The scope and
reach of what is required of a Party by [the fair and equitable treatment] standard has
been addressed in numerous arbitrations and debated by scholars; this case is no
different.").
100. Pope & Talbot, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 110.
101. SeeFOLSOM, supra note 64, at 171.
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tribunalsI02-that article 1105 requires only "the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens."1
03
Such treatment is epitomized by the 1926 arbitral award Neer v.
Mexico.10 4 There, armed men killed a U.S. citizen working in a
mine in Mexico, and the United States pursued claims on behalf
of his survivors. 10 5 Because the United States was unable to prove
that Mexico lacked diligence in bringing those responsible to
justice, relief was denied.10 6 Neer articulated the following
standard to assess government conduct:
[G]overnmental acts .... in order to constitute an
international delinquency, should amount to an outrage, to
bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards
that every reasonable and impartial man would readily
recognize its insufficiency.]0 7
The FTC's interpretation left unresolved whether the
protection that NAFTA article 1105 affords foreign investors has
evolved beyond the Neer standard.10 8
III. GLAMIS SHOULD BE A MODEL FOR INVESTOR-STATE
PROCEEDINGS
The process employed by the Glamis tribunal is exemplary in
a number of aspects. From the outset, Glamis avoided the conflict
102. NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1131(2) ("An interpretation by the Commission of
a provision of this Agreement shall be binding on a Tribunal established under this
Section.").
103. Free Trade Comm'n [FTC], Free Trade Commission Clarifications Related to
NAFTA Chapter 11, § B(1), [1 Chapter 11: Investor-State Arb.] N. Am. Free Trade
Agreements (Oxford Univ. Press) Booklet C.19.1, at 1, 2 (July 31, 2001); see also Glamis,
Award, 599.
104. Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 R. Int'l. Arb. Awards 60 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n (U.S.-Mex.) 1926).
105. See R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 1063 (2005).
106. See id.
107. Neer, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 61-62.
108. Glamis, Award, 600 ("The question thus becomes: what does this customary
international law minimum standard of treatment require of a State Party vis-A-vis
investors of another State Party? Is it the same as that established in 1926 in Neer v.
Mexico? Or has Claimant proven that the standard has 'evolved'? If it has evolved, what
evidence of Custom has Claimant provided to the Tribunal to determine its current
scope?"); see also LOWENFELD, supra note 66, at 558 ("As of mid-year 2007, no court or
arbitral tribunal had ruled on a claim involving the revised formulation, and in
particular whether the effect of the revised formulation is to freeze the standard of
'customary international law' at any particular date.").
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of interest problems sometimes found in investor-state
arbitration. 0 9 The United States selected Professor David D.
Caron from the University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall)
and, in conjunction with Glamis, selected University of Utah
President Michael K. Young to serve as the tribunal president."0
However, the United States challenged Glamis's selection of
Donald L. Morgan because of an alleged conflict of interest and
initiated the mechanism through which the ICSID Secretary-
General determines whether an arbitrator may remain on a
tribunal."' Mr. Morgan thereafter voluntarily resigned from the
tribunal, dispensing with the need for a determination." 2 The
United States did not object to Glamis's subsequent selection of
Kenneth D. Hubbard to serve on the tribunal.11 Although Mr.
Morgan's resignation positively avoided a potential conflict of
interest, a systemic approach is needed to address this
problematic aspect of international arbitration. 114
The tribunal operated with commendable transparency.
NAFTA chapter 11 does not require that proceedings be public
or that nongovernmental organizations be able to participate. 115
However, the 2001 FTC interpretation clarifying the substantive
protection of article 1105 also set forth a procedural obligation
that chapter 11 tribunal documents be made public subject to
109. See Fiona Marshall & Howard Mann, Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules
4-5 (2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2006/
investment_uncitral-rulesrrevision.pdf.
110. See Glamis, Award, 188, at 91-92; see also Berkeley Law, Faculty Profiles:
David C. Caron, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/
facultyProfile.php?faclD=145 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009); Univ. of Utah, Michael K.
Young: President, University of Utah, http://www.admin.utah.edu/president/
presbio.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
111. See Glamis, Award, 1 188 n.548 (citing NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1124(1);
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 12(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98
(Dec. 15, 1976) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules]).
112. See id. 188.
113. Id. Mr. Hubbard is a private practitioner with a Colorado law firm. See
MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY C0142B (2007), available at Marhub CO
4050772 (LEXIS).
114. See Marshall & Mann, supra note 109, at 9 (suggesting reforms to the selection
and challenging of arbitrators to improve the impartiality of investor-state arbitration).
115. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFJA's Investment
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 46-47 (2003). NAFTA does permit the states not party to the action to
participate in the proceedings. NAFI'A, supra note 64, art. 1128.
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the redaction of confidential information. 1 6 In 2003, the FTC
issued a statement providing the procedure for tribunals to allow
nondisputing party participation. 1 7 Glamis explained that amicus
participation "should be granted liberally" 118 and accepted
submissions from the Quechan Tribe,119 environmentalists, 120 and
the mining industry. 21  Arbitration documents were timely
published on the U.S. Department of State website, although
sensitive information was redacted. 122
Arbitral hearings took place at the World Bank office in
Washington, D.C. over nine days during August and September
2007.123 "[T] he public was invited to view the proceedings in a
separate room via closed circuit television. '"1 24 Although the live
feed was stopped during the disclosure of confidential
information, Quechan Tribe members had their own viewing
116. FTC, supra note 103, § A(2)(b).
117. Free Trade Comm'n, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing
Party Participation, [1 Chapter 11: Investor-State Arb.] N. Am. Free Trade Agreements
(Oxford Univ. Press) Booklet C.19.1, at 12 (Oct. 7, 2003).
118. Glamis, Award, 286.
119. Id. 274; see also, Glamis, Decision on Application and Submission by
Quechan Indian Nation (Sept. 16, 2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/53592.pdf; Submission of Non-Disputing Party Quechan Indian Nation,
Glamis (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75016.pdf.
120. See Glamis, Award, 286; see also Submission of Non-Disputing Parties Sierra
Club and Earthworks, Glamis (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/74832.pdf.
121. See Glamis, Award 7 28; see also Submission of Non-Disputing Party National
Mining Association, Glamis (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/75179.pdf. Despite allowing amicus submissions, the tribunal
did not address the submissions in the award. While it "appreciate[d] the thoughtful
submissions made by a varied group of interested non-parties," the tribunal found that
the amicus submissions were beyond the scope of what was necessary to resolve the
dispute and elected to "confine its decision to the issues presented." Glamis, Award, 8.
122. See U.S. Dep't of State, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c10986.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). For a sampling of the
information that was redacted, see Glamis, Award, 7 50, 91-93, 94 n.229, 100-01, 101
n.252, 103-08, 105 n.277, 106 nn.289-92, 108 n.301. This included the location of the
Trail of Dreams, which the Quechan Tribe did not want made public. See id 282.
123. Glamis, Award, 77 299, 303. The place of arbitration is critical because it is
where parties to chapter 11 proceedings can seek to annul the award in a domestic
court. See NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1136(3) (a) (ii); Kahn, supra note 2, at 417 n.225; see
also Coe, supra note 96, at 1389 (observing that Metalclad is the only NAFTA award to be
successfully challenged in a domestic court and, even there, the reviewing Canadian
court found an alternate basis to substantively uphold most of the award).
124. Glamis, Award, 290, at 132; see also Glamis, Procedural Order No. 11, 25
(July 9, 2007), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/88173.pdf. The author of
this Article observed the hearings.
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room to observe discussion of their culture that the general
public could not. 25 This accommodation was made in response
to a request from the Quechan Tribe. 126 The tribunal should be
commended for its open proceedings that respected important
confidences, and allowing amicus participation of interested non-
disputing parties. Glamis achieved its objective that "'proceedings
under NAFTA should strive for increased transparency."' 127
The glaring shortcoming of the Glamis process is the large
lag between the final hearing in September 2007 and the
issuance of the award in June 2009.128 However, this period
appears reasonable given that the tribunal worked thoroughly
with the parties, primarily to resolve disputed discovery. Despite
the lack of firm rules for discovery in arbitration, 129 the tribunal
recognized early on that the attorney-client, 30 deliberative
process,' 31  and work-product privileges 3 2  could protect
documents sought by both parties. 33 The tribunal instructed the
parties to maintain privilege logs and guided them towards
resolution of discovery disputes through an "iterative process." 134
This approach yielded admirable results, as "only a small number
125. Glamis, Award, 290; Glamis, Procedural Order No. 11, 25.
126. Glamis, Award, 290 n.614.
127. See id. 282.
128. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 441 n.350 (anticipating award issuance in June 2008
based on a statistical average).
129. Glamis, Award, 206 ("Article 24 is general in its terms, making clear the
authority of the Tribunal to order the production of 'documents, exhibits or other
evidence' but providing only skeletal guidance as to the exercise of that authority."
(quoting UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 111, art. 24)).
130. Id. 1 222.
131. Id. 1 224.
132. Id. 227.
133. Although the parties "agree[d] that the privilege law of the United States
should be looked to by the tribunal for guidance as to the law of privilege in this
arbitration," they disputed which specific jurisdiction. Decision on Parties' Requests for
Production of Documents Withheld on Grounds of Privilege, Glamis, 1 19 (Nov. 17,
2005), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57342.pdf. The tribunal
reviewed the case law of numerous United States jurisdictions ... and
attempted to identify general consensus between courts that might be helpful
in defining what the Parties would reasonably expect to apply in this situation.
The Tribunal then used this information, combined with its knowledge of an
appreciation for the differences between court proceedings and international
arbitration, to craft standards that can assist the Parties in assessing their
claims of privilege and their objections to such claims.
Id 1 20 (citation omitted).
134. Glamis, Award, 12.
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of documents required individual production decisions by the
tribunal." 135 Discovery rulings narrowed the number documents
subject to disagreement as the arbitration progressed. 136 Only six
documents remained disputed at the September 2007 hearings,
at which time Glamis renewed its request that the United States
produce them. 1 7
In March 2008 the tribunal ordered the United States to
produce the outstanding documents, 38 which the United States
produced in August 2008.139 Three of these documents had
portions redacted. 140 According to the United States, California
mandated the redactions and even refused to disclose the
redacted portions to federal attorneys.' 41 Glamis thereafter
requested that the tribunal "draw an adverse inference" from the
redactions, 142 prompting the United States to offer "an in camera
review ... if the Tribunal were to determine that such a review
would be helpful." 143 The tribunal found party consent to be a
prerequisite for in camera review and asked if Glamis so
desired. 144 In October 2008 Glamis declined the offer and instead
"respectfully requested the Tribunal make its ruling on the
redactions and proceed with the issuance of the decision on the
merits."145
This approach positively resulted in the production of all
documents that the tribunal found discoverable and avoided a
federalist showdown over the redactions. The United States
denied possession of the redacted documents and explained that
135. Id.
136. See id. 231-47; see also Glamis, Decision on Requests for Production of
Documents and Challenges to Assertions of Privilege (Apr. 21, 2006),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75784.pdf. In its April 2006 decision,
the tribunal "decided on each request or, in some instances where a request required
the weighing of the Parties' interests, deferred decision." Glamis, Award, 231.
137. See Glamis, Award, 303; see also Transcript of Hearing on the Merits, Glamis,
at 1793 (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93408.pdf.
138. See Glamis, Award, 1 248, 682 n.1440; Glamis, Procedural Order No. 13
(NAFTA Arb. Mar. 21, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/I 10307.pdf.
139. See Glamis, Award, 251, 1 682 n.1440.
140. See id. 252.
141. See id. 7 711-12, 751 & n.1648, 753-54, (argument based on California's
explanation for the redactions).
142. Id. 9 252.
143. Id. 253.
144. See id. 1 255.
145. Id. 1 256 (quoting Claimant's Letter to the Tribunal, Glamis (Oct. 15, 2008)).
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California produced "thousands of documents" in a "spirit of
voluntary cooperation," as opposed to being "party to this
arbitration."' 146 The tribunal was ultimately able to resolve the
discovery matter without upsetting the delicate relationship
between the United States and California; although Glamis
objected to the redactions, it chose not to pursue the offered in
camera review. Thus the tribunal was not compelled to force the
U.S. federal government to invoke supremacy over its political
subdivision, California. 147
The delay associated with the tribunal's time-intensive
approach to discovery was offset by the beneficial outcome. 148
Similarly, in March 2008, the tribunal sought additional
clarification from the parties on a central issue-the financial
assurances available to Glamis for securing state and federal
authorization of its P00.149 The parties provided submissions by
May 2008.150 Given the tribunal's diligence in seeking
clarification on an important issue and resolving discovery, the
award issuance in June 2009 constituted a reasonable time frame
instead of undue delay. Future investor-state arbitration tribunals
should follow this Glamis pattern by rendering their decisions in
a timely fashion and documenting the basis for delay if there is a
significant gap between the final hearing and award issuance.
Lastly, Glamis exemplifies model investor-state arbitration by
requiring the losing party to pay two-thirds of the costs. Although
both of Glamis's claims were denied, the tribunal thereafter
recognized its discretion in terms of awarding costs.1 5' Glamis
required the loser to pay two-thirds of the nonattorney costs of
arbitration as opposed to the entire amount because the
146. Id. 751.
147. NAFTA appears to give tribunals this authority based on its systematic
supremacy of federal governments. See NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 105 ("The Parties
shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order to give effect to the provisions
of this Agreement, including their observance ... by state and provincial
governments."). Nevertheless, Glamis should be commended for avoiding an
unnecessary mandate.
148. See Glamis, Award, 12 ("The extensive Party-driven document production
aspect of this proceeding required time, but it is the Tribunal's view that the active
involvement of the Tribunal in providing guidance to the Parties both expedited and
limited the extent of the effort.").
149. See id. 304-05.
150. See id. 308.
151. See id. 832.
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"Claimant raised difficult and complicated claims based in at
least one area of unsettled law, and both Parties well argued their
positions with considerable legal talent and respect for one
another, the process and the Tribunal." 5 2 This statement invites
future investor-state tribunals to similarly take into consideration
claim strength and party conduct in allocating arbitration costs.
Claimants, as well as defending governments, are on notice that
frivolous allegations will be penalized and behavior during the
arbitration will factor into the ultimate distribution of costs.
Given its overwhelmingly positive process and its substantive
analyses described below, Glamis was rightfully well received by
U.S. officials. 53
IV. THE GLAMIS REGULA TORY TAKINGS ANALYSIS GOES
BEYOND U.S. LAW TO GIVE GOVERNMENTS CONFIDENCE TO
REGULATE WITHOUT FEAR OF COMPENSATION
Glamis affirms the relationship between U.S. takings law and
article 1110. NAFTA takings claimants have procedural
advantages over U.S. domestic litigants. For example, Glamis had
the merits of its challenge arbitrated despite two jurisdictional
defects that would likely preclude such consideration by a U.S.
court. However, any procedural disadvantage to government is
more than offset by the substantive takings analysis that Glamis
employs. Applying its "inverse Lucas" framework, the tribunal
found the economic impact in question to be insufficient to
require compensation, without even having to consider any other
factors. This approach gives governments confidence to regulate
and should be used to assess takings challenges worldwide.
A. U.S. Takings Law
The Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution originally
compensated property owners when the government physically
took their land. 154 The Supreme Court, in 1922, extended this
152. Id. 833.
153. See Brevetti, supra note 89, at 826 (quoting government officials and
congressmen as positively reacting to the award).
154. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation."); Kahn, supra note 2, at 403, 405. This protection is
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV;
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protection to actions short of actual acquisition, explaining that
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'155 This
language "generated decades of uncertainty as to when a
regulation ... triggers the constitutional obligation to
compensate."' 156 In 1978 the Supreme Court set forth an
analytical framework to assess regulatory takings claims in Penn
Central Transportation Corp. v. New York City.157 The plaintiff
challenged the denial of a permit to construct a large office
building above Grand Central. 158 The structure was a designated
architectural landmark-"one of New York City's most famous
buildings" and "a magnificent example of the French beaux-arts
style."'159 The Supreme Court denied compensation, 160 and over
time crafted a three-factor framework to assess whether a
regulatory taking has occurred: 161 (1) economic impact of the
regulation 162-a sufficiently large devaluation is required for a
taking, and a greater economic impact increases the likelihood of
compensation; 63  (2) "reasonable investment-backed
expectations"'164  ("RIBEs")-an objective assessment as to
whether the government action complained of was "foreseeable"
or could have been "reasonably anticipated" considering the
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (applying the protection to
state and local government).
155. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
156. Kahn, supra note 2, at 405.
157. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
158. See id. at 116-17.
159. Id. at 115.
160. See id. at 138.
161. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124).
162. Id. (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
163. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLAJ. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 171, 178 (2005) ("Generally speaking, the greater the economic impact of a
government action the greater the likelihood of a taking. Furthermore, in the absence
of a very significant economic impact, a regulatory taking claim will generally fail; as the
Supreme Court has explained, takings recovery is limited to 'extreme circumstances.''
(quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985))).
164. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
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"regulatory environment" context;165 and (3) "character of the
government action"' 66-analyzing the regulation under review. 167
This Penn Central framework was revisited in the 1992 case
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.168 There the plaintiff was
unable to develop his fragile beachfront property because of
erosion concerns. 169 The Supreme Court found a taking because
of "total" economic deprivation, concluding that regulations are
compensable "where the government has deprived a landowner
of all economically beneficial uses."1 70 Given the enormity of the
economic impact, a taking was found without inquiry as to RIBEs
or the character of the government action. 17' Lucas therefore
modifies the Penn Central framework such that a severe economic
impact will result in a taking without consideration of the
remaining factors. 72
In 2002, one decade after Lucas, the Supreme Court
confined its applicability in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 173 Forming a border between
California and Nevada, Lake Tahoe is "the fairest picture the
whole earth affords." 174 The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
("TRPA") imposed a thirty-two month planning moratorium to
preserve environmentally sensitive lands while it undertook a
165. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001));
Echeverria, supra note 163, at 184.
166. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
167. The Penn Central character factor, initially understood as evaluating the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the subject government regulation, was narrowed to
eliminate these considerations in Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A, Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543-48
(2005). See Echeverria, supra note 163, at 199. In the wake of Lingle, the precise content
of the factor is subject to debate. See Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An
Exegesis of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
63, 99-101 (2008). Nevertheless, the focus of this factor is clearly whether the regulation
can be characterized as "so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct
appropriation or ouster." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537.
168. 505 U.S. 1003 (1993).
169. See id. at 1007-08.
170. Id. at 1018.
171. See Echeverria, supra note 163, at 178.
172. See id.
173. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
174. MARKTWAIN, ROUGHING IT 169 (Signet Classics 1994) (1872).
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comprehensive planning process for the watershed. 75 At issue
was whether this moratorium constituted a taking. With all three
Penn Central factors weighing in favor of TRPA, 176 the Supreme
Court denied compensation. 177 Tahoe-Sierra clarifies that Lucas
will require compensation only in the "extraordinary case,"
whereas Penn Central remains the "default rule" and "polestar" to
evaluate regulatory takings. 178
Apart from the substantive analysis, U.S. takings law has
developed jurisdictional prerequisites that must be fulfilled
before a claim can be pursued. U.S. claimants seeking
compensation must establish a cognizable property interest upon
which a regulatory action allegedly affects a taking. Lucas
requires this "antecedent inquiry" as to whether "the proscribed
use interests were ... part of [the owner's] title to begin with." 179
Additionally, U.S. courts will only consider the merits of a "ripe"
challenge to government action. As evidenced when the district
court dismissed the lawsuit Glamis initiated to challenge the
Leshy Opinion, claims ripen after "the administrative agency has
arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply
regulations at issue to the particular land in question."' 80 The
Supreme Court explains that this requirement is especially strict
in the takings context:
A landowner may not establish a taking before a land-use
authority has the opportunity, using its own reasonable
procedures, to decide and explain the reach of a challenged
regulation. Under our ripeness rules a takings claim based
on a law or regulation which is alleged to go too far in
burdening property depends upon the landowner's first
having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow
175. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302; see alsoJordan C. Kahn, Lake Tahoe Clarity and
Takings Jurisprudence: the Supreme Court Advances Land Use Planning in Tahoe-Sierra, 26
ENVTL. L. & POL'YJ. 33 (2002).
176. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1242 (D. Nev. 1999) (finding against takings liability using the Penn Central
analysis). Because the district court found takings liability under Lucas and the plaintiffs
did not appeal the Penn Centralholding, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the U.S. Supreme
Court had the opportunity to review the district court's Penn Central conclusion. See
Kahn, supra note 175, at 50.
177. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.
178. Id. at 332, 336-37.
179. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1993).
180. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985).
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regulatory agencies to exercise their full discretion in
considering development plans for the property, including
the opportunity to grant any variances or waivers allowed by
law. 181
Without the plaintiff first demonstrating both a ripe claim
and a cognizable property interest, U.S. courts will not evaluate
the merits of a claim under the Takings Clause.
B. Glamis Confirms that NAFTA Takings Claims Have Procedural
Advantages
Whereas the tribunal arbitrated Glamis's article 1110 claim
on its merits, a U.S. court would likely have procedurally
dismissed the claim had Glamis pursued it under the Takings
Clause. In April 2005, the United States sought bifurcation of the
proceedings with preliminary consideration of its jurisdictional
defenses including the lack of a ripe claim. 182 The tribunal
denied the request in May 2005, exercising its discretion to
proceed with consideration of the merits. 8 3 The United States
continued during the merits phase to argue that Glamis's article
1110 claim suffered jurisdictional defects. 184  Under U.S.
precedent, owners of mineral rights do not have recognized
property interests in the ability to mine free from compliance
with subsequently enacted environmental regulation. 185 The
181. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 620-21 (2001).
182. See Request for Bifurcation of Respondent United States of America, Glamis
Gold, Ltd. v United States, at 4-5 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Apr. 8, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45119.pdf. The United States also
sought bifurcation based on acts challenged by Glamis being outside of NAFTA's three-
year statute of limitations. See id. at 2-3; see also NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1117(2). The
tribunal eventually determined that the events occurring more than three years from the
initiation of arbitration were not time barred, but instead "were raised merely as 'factual
predicates"' that properly provide "context" for Glamis's claims. Glamis, Award, 11 13,
349 (2009). Glamis thus recognizes that NAFTA's three-year statute of limitations is
flexible. Id. 1 347.
183. Glamis, Procedural Order No. 2, 9 16 (May 31, 2005), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/47249.pdf, see also UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note
111, art. 21(4) ("In general, the arbitral tribunal should rule on a plea concerning its
jurisdiction as a preliminary question. However, the arbitral tribunal may proceed with
the arbitration and rule on such a plea in their final award.").
184. See Counter-Memorial of Respondent, supra note 4, at 108-19; Rejoinder of
Respondent United States of America, Glamis, at 3-11 (Mar. 15, 2007),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/82700.pdf.
185. This precedent exists pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, see Reeves v. United
States, 54 Fed. Cl. 652, 669 (2002) (dismissing takings challenge where federal
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United States relied on these cases, 186 which Glamis distinguished
in reply.18 7
In its award, the tribunal did not address whether Glamis
had a cognizable property interest in its Mining Act of 1872
claims. 88 This jurisdictional shortcoming could have prevented
merits consideration of Glamis's takings claim in U.S. courts.18 9
The tribunal's disregard of this issue and denial of the
bifurcation request reveal that NAFTA takings claimants have
procedural advantages over domestic litigants in that the scope of
NAFTA chapter 11 is broader. This result is attributable to
NAFTA's exceptionally broad "investment" definition, 190 which
"covers a great deal more than the property interests traditionally
protected by the Fifth Amendment." 191
The tribunal found ripeness to be a prerequisite for NAFTA
takings claims, albeit one that is looser than under U.S. law.
Glamis explained the NAFTA ripeness requirement in the
following respect:
Through the language of Article 1117(1), the State Parties
conceived of a ripeness requirement in that a claimant needs
to have incurred loss or damage in order to bring a claim for
compensation .... Claims only arise under NAIFTA Article
1110 when actual confiscation follows, and thus mere threats
of expropriation or nationalization are not sufficient to make
government denied application to explore and mine pursuant to unpatented mining
claims), and state constitutions that contain takings clauses with language identical to
the Fifth Amendment. See Seven Up Pete Venture v. State, 114 P.3d 1009, 1017 (Mont.
2005) (dismissing challenge to the state's prohibition on cyanide heap leach mining
enacted through voter initiative by plaintiff who had invested heavily in mineral rights
acquired before the prohibition but had not yet obtained any permit to authorize
mining because "an owner cannot maintain an action for loss of a property right" that it
never had); Kinross Copper Corp. v. State, 981 P.2d 833, 836 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(dismissing takings challenge where state government denied wastewater discharge
permit to lessee of unpatented mining claims).
186. See Counter-Memorial of Respondent, supra note 4, at 123-33.
187. See Reply Memorial of Claimant Glamis Gold, Glamis, at 14-15 (Dec. 15, 2006)
(arguing that Seven Up Pete involved Montana state mineral leases).
188. See Glamis, Award, 309-52 (ruling on "Preliminary Objections" and not
addressing the U.S. argument that Glamis lacked a cognizable property interest
protected under the takings doctrine).
189. SeeKahn, supra note 2, at 465-69.
190. SeeNAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1139.
191. Been & Beauvais, supra note 115, at 42; see also Echeverria, supra note 71, at 28,
33 (explaining that "essentially every type of law, regulation, contract, policy decision, or
other governmental action affecting the investor" is subject to article 1110).
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such a claim ripe; for an Article 1110 claim to be ripe, the
governmental act must have directly or indirectly taken a
property interest resulting in actual present harm to an
investor.192
The tribunal perceived the ripeness rationale as facilitating
economic impact evaluation: "[w] ithout a governmental act that
moves beyond a mere threat of expropriation to an actual
interference with a property interest, it is impossible to assess the
economic impact of the interference. '" 193 The tribunal connected
the ripe claim requirement to the first Penn Central factor by
concluding that "the inquiry into ripeness in this case leads
directly to the threshold inquiry of any expropriation analysis:
evaluation of the economic impacts of the complained of
measures."
194
The tribunal held Glamis's takings challenge to be
sufficiently ripe. 195 The United States emphasized both the lack a
final agency action applying the California measures to the
project and Glamis's ability to submit a modified POO that could
profitably comply with the complete backfill requirement. 196 The
tribunal nevertheless determined that the Imperial Project "likely
would be affected by the legislation should its application
progress to the point at which those requirements would be
applied."197  Moreover, Glamis's expropriation claim was
determined to be ripe as of December 12, 2002, because the
tribunal could assess the economic impact of the California
measures as of that date. l98 The conclusion that NAFTA ripeness
192. Glamis, Award, 328. The relevant NAVrA language makes as a prerequisite
for a claim "that the enterprise has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out
of, that breach." NAFTA, supra note 64, art. 1117 (1).
193. Glamis, Award, 331.
194. Id. 342.
195. See id. 333, 342.
196. See id. 9340.
197. Id. 336.
198. See id. 91 342. Assessment of the economic impact as of December 12, 2002, was
facilitated by the parties' agreement that the gold price was US$326 per ounce on that
date. See id. 91 474, 479. The tribunal declined as unnecessary consideration of
economic impact using the present gold price. See id. 478-79 ("[T]he Tribunal need
not consider the relevance, if any, of the current price of gold to this dispute .... The
relevance of future gold prices, though debated intensely between the Parties, does not
aid in this inquiry."). The tribunal specifically rejected as unripe any contention that
California would never authorize the project because Glamis did not present sufficient
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is satisfied by the mere passage of restrictions as opposed to their
specific application deviates from U.S. ripeness that ordinarily
requires final agency action. 99 The tribunal focuses exclusively
on requiring ripe claims to facilitate economic assessment and
ignores another critical rationale of efficacy. Litigation or
arbitration may be avoided altogether if the government has the
opportunity to achieve an acceptable resolution in the permitting
process, and will proceed more efficiently if there is a complete
record to review.200
Glamis contributes to the emerging international ripeness
doctrine by articulating such a prerequisite for NAFTA article
1110 claims.201 However, consideration of Glamis's takings
challenge notwithstanding the lack of final agency action
applying the California measures demonstrates that NAFTA
ripeness is looser than U.S. law. Given the bifurcation request
denial and unwillingness to even address the existence of a
cognizable property interest under the Mining Act of 1872 in
having to comply with subsequent environmental requirements,
Glamis confirms that NAFTA takings claimants have procedural
advantages over U.S. litigants. The Glamis outcome is jarring
because the challenge brought by a Canadian was predicated on
Mining Act of 1872 rights exclusively for U.S. citizens. 20 2
evidence that "no viable option could be developed some time in the future, with
improved technology and, in particular, increased gold prices." Id. 1 342.
199. Glamis argued that further application processing was "futile"-an exception
to the ripeness requirement recognized in Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d
1169, 1170-72 (Fed. Cir. 1991). See Glamis, Award, 326. In addressing the Whitney
Benefits argument, the tribunal concluded that Glamis did not need to have its
application formally acted upon because "it is almost certain that such final decision
would be a denial." Id. 1 339. However, Whitney Benefits is distinguishable because there
the legislation "expressly precluded a permit for surface mining." Whitney Benefits, 926
F.2d at 1170-72. By contrast, the California measures impose environmental reclamation
requirements as opposed to an outright prohibition on mining. See Transcript of
Hearing on the Merits, Glamis, at 1837-39, 2088-89 (Sept. 17, 2007),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93408.pdf.
200. See Kahn, supra note 2, at 471-72.
201. See Glamis, Award, 11 328-31 (discussing ripeness requirement under
international law).
202. See Submission of Non-Disputing Parties Sierra Club and Earthworks, Glamis, 1
18 (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/74832.pdf; Alison
Ochs, Note, Glamis Gold Ltd.-A Foreign United States Citizen?: NAFTA and its Potential
Effect on Environmental Regulations and the Mining Law of 1872, 16 COLO.J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'y 495, 502-04 (2005) (arguing that Glamis should not be treated superior to
U.S. citizens concerning rights under the Mining Act of 1872). Environmentalists
continue to attack Glamis on the basis that the claimant simultaneously pursued rights
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Nevertheless, any procedural disadvantages to the United States
in defending NAFTA takings challenges is more than offset by its
substantive analysis that makes article 1110 compensation
significantly less likely than through the Fifth Amendment.
C. Glamis Employs an "Inverse-Lucas "Analysis To Deny
Compensation
Glamis begins its article 1110 takings discussion by
acknowledging Penn Central.20 3 This reference to U.S. law is
unsurprising given that the three-factor framework for assessing
takings is set forth in the U.S. Model BIT.20 4 However, Glamis
modifies the setup by explaining that the "severity of the
economic impact and the duration of that impact" is a
"foundational threshold inquiry" to be conducted before
consideration of RIBEs and the "character of the government
actions taken." 20 5 The tribunal elaborates that the takings
"analysis should begin with determining whether the economic
impact of the complained of measures is sufficient to potentially
constitute a taking at all." 20 6 This approach is similar to Lucas in
that it starts with the economic impact factor and, in certain
circumstances, resolves the takings challenge without having to
consider the remaining Penn Central factors. Both consider only
economic impact, but reach opposite results. While Lucas
afforded exclusively to either U.S. or Canadian citizens. See Brevetti, supra note 89, at
827 ("Margrete Strand Ranges, director of the Sierra Club's Responsible Trade
program, said ... that the fact that Glamis's claim was even possible shows why foreign
investor rules in trade agreements must be altered.").
203. Glamis, Award, 356 n.703.
204. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR], U.S. MODEL BIT
Annex B 4(a) (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
U.S. model BIT.pdf. ("The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a
Party, in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-
by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors: (i) the economic impact
of the government action, although the fact that an action or series of actions by a Party
has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not
establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the
government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed expectations;
and (iii) the character of the government action."); David Schneiderman, Property Rights
and Regulatory Innovation: Comparing Constitutional Cultures, 4 INT'LJ. CON. L. 371, 387
(2006) (observing the inclusion of Penn Central factors in modifications to bilaterial
investment treaties. ("BIT") between the United States and Chile, Morocco, and
Singapore).
205. Glamis, Award, 356.
206. Glamis, Award, 357.
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considers this factor alone to require compensation, 2 7 Glamis
focuses exclusively on economic impact as a basis for eliminating
takings liability. Glamis thereby follows an "inverse-Lucas"
approach.
The tribunal recognizes the takings law precept that
compensation is only mandated if there is a substantial
devaluation. 208 It describes its takings task as having "[t]o
determine whether Claimant's investment in the Imperial Project
has been so radically deprived of its economic value to Claimant
as to constitute an expropriation and violation of Article 1110."209
Before dissecting the economic impact of the California
measures, Glamis quickly denied compensation for federal
government actions. The award explained that the 2001 denial
was quickly reversed and therefore of short duration. This
does not constitute an expropriation under NAFTA Article
1110. The Tribunal therefore denies Claimant's claim that
the delay and temporary denial occasioned by the federal
government either individually or in combination with
subsequent complained of measures of the State of
California were violations of Article 1110.210
The tribunal then proceeds to the key question "of whether
there has been a radical diminution in value of the Imperial
Project, which is ascertained by the analysis of the entitlements
and value that remain with Claimant after the enactment of these
[California] measures."211
The tribunal worked through Glamis's valuation
methodology. According to Glamis, the Imperial Project reduced
in value from US$49.1 million to negative US$8.9 million as a
207. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1993); Echeverria, supra
note 71, at 178.
208. See Glamis, Award, 357; see also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1 ARB (AF)/02/1, Award, 176(c) n.157 (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. July 17, 2006), http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Fireman/
FiremansFund-Mexico-FinalAward.pdf. (observing that in explaining the requisite
degree of economic deprivation, NAFTA "tribunals employ the adjective 'significant,
'fundamental,' 'radical' or 'serious"'); Echeverria, supra note 71, at 178 ("[I]n the
absence of a very significant economic impact, a regulatory takings claim will generally
fail.").
209. Glamis, Award, 358.
210. Id. 1 360.
211. Id. 361.
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result of the California measures. 212 The tribunal examined each
valuation element "one-by-one" in conjunction with the
corresponding U.S. position,2 3 describing and qualifying its
undertaking as follows:
This approach-namely, the Tribunal's acceptance of
Claimant's assumptions as a starting point-is a best case
scenario for Claimant. In essence, this approach asks: "Even
if the Tribunal accepts Claimant's pre-backfilling measures
valuation as correct and further accepts Claimant's
characterization of the factors resulting in a reduced value,
does a review of the claimed reduction and the resulting
adjustments by the Tribunal result in a radical diminution in
the value of the Imperial Project?"
... [T]he Tribunal's goal in this inquiry into Claimant's
valuation model is not to determine if there was an
expropriation, but to determine if there was not significant
economic impact. .. . [T]he question ... is not what is the
exact value of the Imperial Project following the complained
of measures, but is the value of the post-backfilling Imperial
Project positive even if such an issue is decided in Claimant's
favor.214
The tribunal concluded that "the California backfilling
measures did not result in a radical diminution in the value of
the Imperial Project."215 Through its valuation analysis, Glamis
determined that "the post-backfilling valuation of the Imperial
Project exceeds [US]$20 million." 216 The tribunal reached this
calculation only after painstakingly considering each value
component and adjusting Glamis's methodology as appropriate.
Specifically, the tribunal reduced the backfilling cost from the
35.3 U.S. cents per ton figure that Glamis used to 28.44 U.S.
cents per ton, in accordance with the "bottom up" approach
advocated by the United States; 217 halved the claimed cost of
equipment refurbishment to US$7.7 million after being
212. See id. 1362.
213. Id. 1 16.
214. Id. 11 364-65; see also id 1 364 n.719 (noting that "this methodology would
not apply at a damages phase, where the Tribunal would be required to reach a final
definitive number; whereas in this situation the Tribunal need only reach the conclusion
that substantial value remained.").
215. Id. 1 366.
216. Id. 1 535.
217. See id. 11 371, 416, 534.
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convinced by the United States that only a single refurbishment
was necessary;218 replaced the "swell factor"-the amount by
which material expands when removed from the pits, thereby
affecting reclamation costs2 19 -of 35% that Glamis used with
30.2%, resulting in a reduction of the claimant's estimated
tonnage to be hauled by six million tons;220 included the US$6.43
million valuation for the Singer Pit that Glamis counted in the
prebackfill scenario in the postbackfill scenario also, although
18.7 million tons were added "to the total estimated tonnage to
be moved and backfilled to account for this additional
mining"; 221 adjusted Glamis's valuation model to use as financial
assurances "a letter of credit at a fee of 1% per annum for the
entire reclamation amount posted prior to the commencement
of any mining activity," as opposed to the cash collateralization
that Glamis contended was necessary; 222 and replaced the
discount rate of 6.5% that Glamis used with a rate of 9.283%,
pursuant to the capital asset pricing model advocated by the
United States. 223
The tribunal thereby used Glamis's own economic valuation
methodology to deny compensation. With adjustments rendering
the Imperial Project worth in excess of US$20 million on
December 12, 2002, the takings claim was denied without having
to consider RIBEs or the character of the government action, or
even a different valuation methodology than that employed by
Glamis. 224 From this valuation, the tribunal held that the first
Penn Central factor was not satisfied because "the complained-of
measures did not cause a sufficient economic impact to the
Imperial Project to effect an expropriation of Claimant's
investment. '" 225 Glamis demonstrates the inverse-Lucas approach
218. See id. 911 418-19, 534.
219. See id. 420.
220. See id. 1 383, 423, 431, 534.
221. Id. 1 495,534.
222. Id. 9 485-88, 514, 534. Arbitrator Hubbard dissented from this aspect of the
award but concurred that no compensation was required, expressing his "feel[ing] that
Claimant met its burden of proving that its financial assurances would have required
cash collateral. As this determination did not alter the overall conclusion of the Tribunal
with respect to its finding of no breach of Article 1110, however, arbitrator Hubbard has
chosen to join this decision." Id. 355, 511 n.1044.
223. See id. 517, 520, 532, 534.
224. See id. 91 535-36.
225. Id. 536.
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to takings that can deny compensation based solely upon the first
Penn Central factor.
D. Glamis Gives Governments Confidence to Regulate Without Fear of
Takings Liability
The Glamis takings framework is remarkable. It presents a
focused approach to assessing whether compensation is required.
Because "economic impact" is the "most important" Penn Central
factor, it should logically function as the analytical starting
point.226 Resort to the other factors is not necessary where takings
liability can be eliminated based on an insufficient economic
impact. By preventing consideration of unnecessary factors
before finding the prerequisite economic impact, Glamis tightens
the takings analysis. Under the Fifth Amendment, a litigant may
attempt to bolster an otherwise insufficient devaluation by
demonstrating interference with RIBEs and characterizing the
government as acting negatively. In its "inverse-Lucas" approach,
Glamis goes beyond U.S. law to preclude a claimant from
invoking the RIBEs and character factors unless a substantial
economic impact is first proven.
The critical query arising from the Glamis takings analysis is
what remaining value will avoid takings liability. The tribunal
found US$20 million to be sufficient, even though it was
obviously less than the investment value without the California
measures. This begs the question of what is the requisite amount,
both to eliminate the possibility of a taking altogether or to
enable consideration of RIBEs and character.227 These sums will
necessarily depend on the "context" and "circumstances" of each
challenge. 228 Nevertheless, governments can act in advance to
minimize the likelihood of being required to compensate. With
economic inquiry at the forefront of the takings inquiry,
governments should emphasize the postregulatory residual value
for affected investments. Governments can proactively provide
such investors with value through tools such as transferable
226. See Echeverria, supra note 71, at 209.
227. Glamis's takings analysis suggests that there is a value range wherein
compensation is not automatically denied based upon economic impact, but instead
enables consideration of the expectations and character factors.
228. Glamis, Award, 356 n.705 (quoting Saluka v. Czech Republic, Partial Award,
264 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Mar. 17, 2006), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil-id=105).
2009]
134 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 33:101
development rights ("TDRs"). 229 In appropriate circumstances,
governments may elect to negotiate buyouts-as was
contemplated with Glamis.230 Even if significantly less than the
maximum valuation scenario, TDRs and buyout offers can be
used to demonstrate residual value and therefore withstand
takings liability. Most urgently, governments should undertake
economic forecasting during their regulatory processes to
provide contemporaneous documentation that regulated
investments retain residual value, so that subsequent takings
challenges are best able to be defended against.
The Glamis takings approach gives governments confidence
to regulate without fear of having to compensate affected
investors. While significant value remains, there is no takings
liability. If the value is found to be insufficient, governments can
still avoid having to compensate by arguing the lack of RIBEs and
positive characterization of its action. The "inverse-Lucas"
framework thereby works to the advantage of governments as
they enact regulations in this era of pressing environmental
concern. Additionally, Glamis's quick dismissal of takings liability
for a delayed federal permitting process strongly endorses the
ability of government to swiftly address imminent threats. 2 1 This
aspect of the award is in accord with Tahoe-Sierra, in which TRPA
did not have to compensate property owners for the temporary
freeze on the development of sensitive land. 23 2 Glamis thereby
contributes to international jurisprudence that supports
environmental planning and protection.
Courts and tribunals worldwide should adopt Glamis's
takings analysis. The affinity between the Takings Clause and
international expropriation law is evident; the Restatement
recognizes that, "[i]n general, the line in international law is
similar to that drawn in United States jurisprudence for purposes
of the Fifth... Amendment to the Constitution in determining
229. The plaintiff being given transferable development rights ("TDRs") factored
against finding takings liability in Penn Central Transportation Corp. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 137 (1978). For a description of the TDRs program at Lake Tahoe, see Kahn,
supra note 175, at 39-40.
230. See Glamis, Award, 164 n.487.
231. See id. 360.
232. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
334-42 (2002).
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whether there has been a taking requiring compensation. '" 233
This connection is shown by the Penn Central framework making
its way into the U.S. Model BIT and Glamis.234Just as U.S. takings
law influences international expropriation law, the reverse can be
realized. When the U.S. Supreme Court next considers the
Takings Clause, it should adopt the "inverse-Lucas" approach
employed by Glamis. Moreover, this method should be used in
future investor-state takings challenges under NAFTA and
bilateral investment treaties. Such a logical and simplified takings
analysis will positively maximize the confidence of governments
to regulate without fear of having to compensate. Given our
precarious environmental situation, the stakes are too great for
governments to be afraid of acting.
V. THE "FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT" ANALYSIS IN
GLAMIS, DESPITE DISINGENUOUSLY EQUATING ARTICLE
1105 WITH NEER, PROMOTES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The tribunal decided that the customary international
minimum standard of treatment embodied in article 1105 is the
same as Neer. However, the standard is viewed in the modern
context such that governments today can cause violations
through actions that were not shocking in 1926. Glamis sets forth
two distinct approaches to evaluating modern-day Neer violations
that align with the "character of the government action" and
"expectations" factors in the Penn Central framework. 23 5 The
character inquiry asks whether the actions under review can be
described as specified types of government malfeasance that are
deemed article 1105 violations. Glamis concluded that the
challenged federal and California actions pass this standard.
Glamis further found no intergovernmental collusion that could
233. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
712 reporters' note 6 (2009).
234. See USTR, supra note 204, annex B 4(a); Glamis, Award, 1 356 n.703.
235. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001), (citing Penn Cent.
Trans. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); Glamis, Award, 1 627 ("Such a
breach may be exhibited by a 'gross denial of justice or manifest arbitrariness falling
below acceptable international standards;' or the creation by the State of objective
expectations in order to induce investment and the subsequent repudiation of those
expectations." (quoting Int'l Thunderbird Gaming Corp. v. United Mexican States,
Final Award, 1 194, [1 Chapter 11: Investor-State Arbitration] N. Am. Free Trade
Agreements (Oxford Univ. Press) Booklet C.19Z, at 1, 38 (Jan. 26, 2006)).
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violate article 1105 even where each underlying action in
isolation does not. The federal and California governments also
withstood challenge against the expectations-based article 1105
standard that Glamis articulates by morphing RIBEs from U.S.
takings law and "specific assurances" from NAFTA article 1110
awards. Although the equation of these expectations and
character inquiries with Neer is pure sophistry, the result is an
analytical framework that positively promotes foreign direct
investment.
A. Glamis Equates Article 1105 with Neer, Albeit in the Modern
Context
The tribunal initially determined that article 1105 protects
foreign investors in accordance with the Neer standard.2 6 Glamis
concluded that, "although situations presented to tribunals are
more varied and complicated today than in the 1920s, the level of
scrutiny required under Neer is the same." 237 Therefore, in order
to violate the internationally recognized minimum standard of
treatment, "an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking
... so as to fall below accepted international standards and
constitute a breach of Article 1105(1)."238 Glamis did not carry its
burden of establishing that customary international law has since
evolved beyond Neer.239 As a practical matter, this applicability of
Neer precludes the tribunal from considering investor-state
awards that rely on BIT-based "fair and equitable treatment"
236. Glamis, Award, 612 ("It appears to this Tribunal that the NAFTA State
Parties agree that, at a minimum, the fair and equitable treatment standard is that as
articulated in Neer.").
237. Id. 22.
238. Id. 616.
239. See id. 614 ("[T]he Tribunal finds that the evidence provided by Claimant
does not establish such an evolution."). The tribunal also went on to declare that Glamis
failed to establish that a standard other Neer should serve as a benchmark. See id. 627
("The Tribunal holds that Claimant has not met its burden of proving that something
other than the fundamentals of the Neer standard apply today."). As to this latter point,
the tribunal took care to note at the outset the difficulty in identifying a shift in
customary international law. See Id. 602 ("The Tribunal acknowledges that it is difficult
to establish a change in customary international law. As Respondent explains,
establishment of a rule of customary international law requires: (1) 'a concordant
practice of a number of States acquiesced in by others,' and (2) 'a conception that the
practice is required by or consistent with the prevailing law (opinion juris)."' (citation
omitted)).
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formulations that, unlike article 1110, are "autonomous" from-
or unconstrained by-international law. 240
Glamis thereby recognizes a schism in international
investment protection. As clarified by the 2001 FTC
interpretation, 241 the customary standard of article 1105 is
distinct from BIT formulations that afford investors greater
protection. 242  This demonstrates that "the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment is just that, a
minimum standard. It is meant to serve as a floor, an absolute
bottom, below which conduct is not accepted by the
international community." 243 The tribunal reasoned that "[t]he
fair and equitable treatment promised by Article 1105 is not
dynamic; it cannot vary between nations as thus the protection
afforded would have no minimum. "244
240. See id. 611 ("The Tribunal therefore holds that it may look solely to arbitral
awards-including BIT awards-that seek to be understood by reference to the
customary international law minimum standard of treatment, as opposed to any
autonomous standard."). To reach this conclusion, Glamis reasoned:
[T]he Tribunal finds that arbitral decisions that apply an autonomous
standard provide no guidance inasmuch as the entire method of reasoning
does not bear on an inquiry into custom. The various BITs cited by Claimant
may or may not illuminate customary international law; they will prove helpful
to this Tribunal's analysis when they seek to provide the same base floor of
conduct as the minimum standard of treatment under customary international
law; but they will not be of assistance if they include different protections that
those provided for in customary international law.
Id. 608.
241. Scholars critical of the 2001 interpretation of the Free Trade Commission will
likely be displeased with Glamis. See LOWENFELD, supra note 66, at 558 (criticizing the
interpretation for "apparently transforming the minimum standard of international law
from the floor to a ceiling of what is required of host states, and creating a possible
discrepancy between the treaties by adopting this formula and the larger number of
BITs with the simpler formulation"); Charles H. Brower, II, Why the FFC Notes of
Interpretation Constitute a Partial Amendment of NAFTA Article 1105, 46 VA.J. INT'L L. 347,
356-63 (2006) (arguing that the interpretation improperly redefines "international law"
in NAFTA).
242. See Glamis, Award, 1 609. The tribunal specifically identified Tecnicas
Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, Award, 43. I.L.M. 133,
174,91 155 (Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Prot. of Invs. Arb. Trib. 2003),
as an award employing the autonomous standard from a BIT between Mexico and
Spain, and therefore inapplicable in resolving article 1105 disputes. See Glamis, Award, 9
610.
243. Id. 1 615; see. id. 1 619 ("[This] is an absolute minimum, a floor below which
the international community will not condone conduct.").
244. Id. 615.
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Glamis then proceeded to place the Neer standard in a
modern-day setting. Although the level of review remains highly
deferential,245 the tribunal held that "the Neer standard, when
applied with current sentiments and to modern situations, may
find shocking and egregious events not considered to reach this
level in the past."2 46 Glamis elaborates that "[t]he standard for
finding a breach of the customary international law minimum
standard of treatment therefore remains as stringent as it was
under Neer, it is entirely possible, however, that, as an
international community, we may be shocked by State actions
now that did not offend us previously. ' 247 Glamis sets forth two
distinct inquiries for assessing modern-day Neer violations in the
context of a dispute between a foreign investor and its host
government. The first focuses on the character of the
government action and the second examines investor
expectations. 248 The tribunal articulates these standards and
applies them to the challenged measures, concluding that
neither the United States nor California violated article 1105 "as
it currently stands." 249
B. Glamis Does Not Characterize the Government Actions as Violating
Article 1105
The tribunal lists characterizations that, if found applicable
to government action under review, will "violat[e] the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment, as codified in
Article 1105."250 According to Glamis, when government acts are
characterized in the following ways, the conduct is "sufficiently
egregious and shocking" to constitute modern-day Neer
245. See id. 1 617 ("The idea of deference is found in the modifiers 'manifest' and
'gross' that makes this standard a stringent one; it is found in the idea that a breach
requires something more than mere arbitrariness, something that is surprising,
shocking, or exhibits a manifest lack of reasons.").
246. Id. 1 613.
247. Id. 9 616.
248. See id. 627.
249. Id. 1 829, at 353. The tribunal qualified its holding by observing that "[t]he
State Parties to the NAFTA can always choose to negotiate a higher standard against
which their behavior will be judged. It is very clear, however, that they have not yet done
so and therefore a breach of Article 1105 still requires acts that exhibit a high level of
shock, arbitrariness, unfairness or discrimination." Id.
250. Id. 1 627.
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violations:251  "a gross denial of justice";252 "manifest
arbitrariness";253 "blatant unfairness";254 "a complete lack of due
process";255 "evident discrimination"; 256 or "manifestly lacking in
reasons. "257
Glamis explains that bad faith is not a prerequisite, but can
establish conclusive evidence of an article 1105 violation under
the modern-day Neer standard. 258 The tribunal then applied this
standard to each federal and California action under review,
both individually and collectively.2 59
1. The Federal and California Actions Are Found Not To
Individually Violate Article 1105
Glamis's challenge to the underlying environmental review
did not result in an article 1105 violation. 260 It "allege[d] that,
during the government's cultural review of the Imperial Project,
Claimant was subjected to arbitrary and nontransparent
treatment."261 The United States, however, convinced the
tribunal "that the Imperial Project was, in fact, unique among its
neighbors with respect to cultural significance. '" 262 The contested
"decisions were reached based upon []mandated cultural studies
251. Id. 9 22, 616, 627.
252. Id. 616, 627, 824, 828.
253. Id. 9 616, 626-27, 824, 828 (" [IT] here is an obligation of each of the NAFTA
State Parties inherent in the fair and equitable treatment standard of Article 1105 that
they do not treat investors of another State in a manifestly arbitrary manner. The
Tribunal thus determines that Claimant has sufficiently substantiated its arguments that
a duty to protect investors from arbitrary measures exists in the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens; though Claimant has not sufficiently
rebutted Respondent's assertions that a finding of arbitrariness requires a determination
of some act far beyond the measure's mere illegality, an act so manifestly arbitrary, so
unjust and surprising as to be acceptable from the international perspective.").
254. Id. 99 616, 627, 824, 828.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. 9 616, 627, 776, 824, 828.
258. Id. 9 616. ("The Tribunal notes that one aspect of evolution from Neer that is
generally agreed upon is that bad faith is not required to find a violation of the fair and
equitable standard, but its presence is conclusive evidence of such. Thus, an act that is
egregious or shocking may also evidence bad faith, but such bad faith is not necessary
for the finding of a violation.").
259. See id. 630, 757.
260. See id. 788.
261. Id. 631.
262. Id. 781.
2009]
140 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 33:101
and the guidance of professional archeologists and
researchers. '" 263 The tribunal held that "Claimant did not prove
that these processes and the decisions based upon them were
either arbitrary or manifestly lacking in reasons." 264 In response
to Glamis's allegations that the finding of unmitigated significant
adverse environmental impacts was "predetermined, '" 265 the
tribunal countered that it did not "view the public hearings or
site visits as 'shams."' 266 To the contrary, "Respondent acted
without arbitrariness, with sufficient reasons, and fairly in
designing the public meetings regarding the Imperial Project
[POO] and the site visit to the Imperial Project itself."2 67 The
tribunal reinforced the limited function of assessing whether
government deprives an investor of "fair and equitable
treatment":
It is not the role of this Tribunal, or any international
tribunal, to supplant its own judgment for that of a qualified
domestic agency. Indeed, our only task is to decide whether
Claimant has adequately proven that the agency's review and
conclusions exhibit a gross denial of justice, manifest
arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due
process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons
so as to rise to the level of a breach of the customary
international law standard embedded in Article 1105.268
The Leshy Opinion easily prevailed in a challenge using the
tribunal's modern-day Neer formulation. 269 It "was not arbitrary"
and "did not exhibit a "manifest lack of reasons," given its
detailed analysis of applicable law such as the FLPMA "undue
impairment" standard. 270 Because the Leshy Opinion is "of
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. 650.
266. Id. 787.
267. Id.
268. Id. 779. The tribunal reinforced this point on several other occasions. See id.
783 (" [T]he Tribunal holds that Respondent was justified in relying upon the opinion
of the professionals it engaged in the way that it did, as these professionals appear quite
qualified for the task and they provided substantial evidentiary support for their
conclusions."); id. 786 (" [I] t is not for this Tribunal to assess the veracity of evidentiary
support for domestic governmental decisions; the Tribunal may assess only whether
there was reasonable evidence, and thus the government's reliance on such was not
obviously and actionably misplaced.").
269. See id. 762.
270. Id. 763-64.
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general applicability," it did not "exhibit blatant unfairness or
evident discrimination to this particular investor .... Whether
anyone might disagree with Solicitor Leshy's opinions or
conclusions is not the issue; [his] Opinion does not rise to the
level of a violation of the requirement of fair and equitable
treatment under international law."271 Because the 2001 DOI
permit denial was based on the Leshy Opinion, the tribunal
concluded that it also did not violate article 1105.272 Because the
Leshy Opinion and permit denial were subsequently revisited by
DOI and changed in Glamis's favor, Glamis's argument that
there had been "a complete lack of due process" was without
merit.2 73
The tribunal additionally concluded that the federal
permitting process did not violate article 1105.274 Specifically, the
time period from the 1994 POO submission through the July
2003 initiation of NAFTA arbitration was found acceptable albeit
slow; the pace justifiable because "this was a particularly
complicated, contested issue in which numerous parties took an
interest."275 DOI's suspension of review upon Glamis's recourse
through NAFTA chapter 11 did not violate article 1105: "the
Tribunal does not find that such a failure of a governmental body
to diligently pursue administrative review while also defending an
arbitration with respect to that same review is manifestly
arbitrary, completely lacking in due process, exhibiting evident
discrimination, or manifestly lacking in reasons." 76
Turning to the California measures, Glamis was equally
unsuccessful. 277 The tribunal determined that SB 22 did not
violate article 1105.278 Glamis claimed unfair targeting because
SB 22 only applied to its proposal, 279 allegedly intending to
render the Imperial Project "economically infeasible. '" 280
Although "clear to the Tribunal that the Imperial Project was
indeed on the minds of the legislators drafting" SB 22, that did
271. Id. 7765.
272. See id. 1 772.
273. See id. 771.
274. See id. 11 776.
275. Id. 774.
276. Id. 7 776.
277. See id. 71 807,811,815, 817-18.
278. See id. 1 807.
279. See id. 1 681, 677, 793.
280. Id. 1 683.
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not necessarily equate with "proof of targeting." 281 Rather, the
legislation's general applicability persuaded Glamis-
The Tribunal determines that, on its face, SB 22 appears to
apply to potentially several mines, if not yet at present, then
in the future....
Whether, in reality, this bill will only serve to limit operation
of the Imperial Project, this Tribunal cannot say. The
Tribunal notes that it appears that it might affect solely the
Imperial Project at present, but the Tribunal is not prescient
and cannot look to the future to see that such a condition
will continue for the life of the bill.
... Claimant has not established that Senate Bill 22 targets
solely the Imperial Project.282
In denying the article 1105 challenge to SB 22, Glamis
affords wide latitude for government solutions. Glamis
contended that in the case of the Imperial Project, SB 22's
complete backfill mandate would actually result in greater land
disturbance than the P00.283 Glamis quickly dispenses with the
notion that legislation must perfectly achieve its objectives by
concluding, "even if more land is disturbed in this situation-of
which the Tribunal is not certain-Claimant has not proven that
this will be the situation with each mine that falls under SB 22's
purview." 28 4 Glamis further claimed that SB 22 frustrated the
stated legislative objective of protecting Native American sacred
sites because backfilling causes disturbance to artifacts. 28 5 The
tribunal rejected this contention, holding that "the government
had a sufficient good faith belief that there was a reasonable
281. Id. 791.
282. Id. 11 794, 796-97; see id. 828 ("The Imperial Project, although certainly
highlighted as a triggering event for some of the measures, was not the subject of
discriminatory targeting.").
283. See id. 687.
284. Id. 1 806. In addition, "this is also the conclusion with respect to Claimant's
argument that SB 22 is so arbitrary as to be in contravention of international law because
more land will actually be disturbed by the complete backfilling measures. Such a result,
even if it were assured, does not preclude the Bill from protecting sacred sight lines and
viewsheds. The Tribunal also recognizes that this legislation is of general
application. . . ." Id.
285. See id. 687, 805.
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connection between the harm and the proposed remedy." 286 The
tribunal endorses the ability of government to reach compromise
between participants having incompatible goals and emphasized
the high standard to establish an article 1105 violation:
The Tribunal agrees with Respondent's assertion that
governments must compromise between interests of
competing parties and, if they were bound to please every
constituent with each piece of legislation, they would be
bound and useless.
... The fact that SB 22 mitigates some, but not all, harm
does not mean that it was manifestly without reason or
arbitrary; it more likely means that it is a compromise
between the conflicting desires and needs of the various
affected parties.287
Glamis fared no better in its article 1105 challenge to the
SMGB regulations. 288 The tribunal explained that "they have in
fact been applied to another project .... and thus they are
proven of general application." 28 9 Glamis argued that the
regulations' application to only metallic mines evinced
arbitrariness. 290 The tribunal discerned otherwise: "SMGB had
legitimate concerns that there were distinct and greater problems
with metallic, as opposed to non-metallic mines." 291 Finally,
Glamis advanced a challenge based on the SMGB regulations
being initially adopted on an emergency basis.292 The tribunal
rejects this assertion:
The finding of an emergency is similar to that of the need
for interim measures. Such a determination is different from
deciding the merits of a case; it is a temporary measure
286. Id.; see id. 803 ("The Tribunal finds that Respondent has presented a prima
facie showing that SB 22 was rationally related to its stated purpose and reasonably
drafted to address its objectives. It is Claimant's burden to prove a manifest lack of
reasons for the legislation, and the Tribunal holds that it has not met this burden.").
287. Id. 804, 805. This language builds upon Methanex in terms of affording
government wide latitude to fashion compromise. See id. 726.
288. See id. 9 811, 815, 817-18.
289. Id. 820 (noting the application of regulations to "the Golden Queen
Soledad Mountain Project").
290. See id. 9 697-98.
291. Id. 817. ("In addition, the Tribunal finds that there was a prima facie
showing that only the issue of metallic mines was presented to the SMGB and it is the
customary practice of the board to address solely the issue of the petition before it and
not broaden its scope.").
292. See id. 99 695-96.
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addressing a pending event while the final determination is
made and the permanent regulations can be put into place.
With respect to the backfilling requirements, it is undisputed
that the primary emergency was that the Imperial Project was
pending and the government wanted to freeze the Project
until the regulations were finalized; though the SMGB
acknowledged its additional intent to prevent any other
similarly positioned project that might be in the permitting
stage and unknown to the board.293
This endorsement of government ability to enact interim
measures is reminiscent of Tahoe-Sierra, despite the non-takings
context. TRPA was not liable for its moratorium on the
development of sensitive lands.2 94 Glamis in its article 1105
analysis similarly facilitates government reaction to imminent
threats by promoting the use of emergency rulemaking. Indeed,
the tribunal states that "it is difficult to see" how temporary
measures "largely connected to subsequent legislation ... could
independently violate international law." 295 With this language,
Glamis builds on Tahoe-Sierra by finding legal norms to support
environmental planning. Governments far beyond Lake Tahoe
should have confidence to tackle urgent concerns using interim
measures that may prove imperfect with hindsight. Given that the
NAFTA "fair and equitable treatment" is equated with the global
minimum, 296 governments worldwide should be encouraged to
act immediately.
293. Id. 1 814. The tribunal determined that the regulation was not speculative
because "at least one project was known and presented a potential danger to Native
American sacred sites, and the possibility existed of other potentially disruptive projects,
yet unknown." Id.
294. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
334-42 (2002).
295. Glamis, Award, 1 815. But the tribunal reserved the possibility that interim
legislation might transgress international law. Id. ("The Tribunal notes that it is possible
that the preceding regulations-whether interim or emergency-could violate
international law even when subsequent final legislation would not. This might happen,
for instance, if the temporary regulations eliminated all foreign businesses ... and the
subsequent measure addressed the problem without such an adverse result.").
296. See supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
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2. The Federal and California Actions Are Found Not To
Collectively Violate Article 1105
Collusion amongst governments is a foremost concern in
the Glamis article 1105 character inquiry. Although the list of
actions that the tribunal determined could violate article 1105
appears extraordinarily difficult to establish, the tribunal explains
that individual actions not rising to the standard may collectively
be elevated to constitute breach:
The Tribunal determines that, for acts that do not
individually violate Article 1105 to nonetheless breach that
article when taken together, there must be some additional
quality that exists only when the acts viewed as a whole, as
opposed to individually....
In this factual situation, the Tribunal holds that it cannot see
that the conduct as a whole would be in violation of the fair
and equitable treatment standard when the individual acts
comprising that whole are not, without a finding of intent.297
The tribunal concluded that this added element of
coordinated intergovernmental intent was not present. Glamis
relied upon the redacted California documents in its assertion
that "there was close coordination and intersection between
passage of SB 22 and the adoption of the SMGB regulation. '" 298
This attempt to obtain an adverse inference was rejected:
The Tribunal does not believe that it is likely that the limited
redactions of these three documents would provide sufficient
evidence to refute the entire rest of the record in this case
and prove that SB 22 and the SMGB Regulations were in fact
coordinated efforts to halt the Imperial Project .... 299
The tribunal similarly rejected Glamis's argument that the
federal and California governments were working in lockstep;
"[a]lthough one set of events definitely appears to pick up where
the other left off, they appear to the Tribunal more as separate
factual clusters, factual groupings that on their own do not
breach Article 1105 and also do not when viewed together."300
Based on this absence of collusion, the government actions not
297. Glamis, Award, 1 825-26.
298. Id. 1 822.
299. Id.
300. Id. 1 827.
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independently characterized as violating article 1105 were not
also violations when considered collectively. 30'
C. Glamis Finds That Investor Expectations Are Insufficient to Violate
Article 1105
The tribunal articulates a separate, expectations-based
approach to evaluating modern-day Neer violations. As the
tribunal explains:
[W]ith respect to reasonable investor relations, a State
Party's duty under Article 1105 arises only when the State has
induced these expectations in a quasi-contractual manner. In
this way, a State may be tied to the objective expectations
that it creates in order to induce investment. Such an upset of
expectations thus requires something greater than mere
disappointment; it requires, as a threshold condition, the
active inducement of a quasi-contractual expectation. 30 2
Glamis stated that "a violation of Article 1105 based on
unsettling of reasonable, investment-backed expectation requires
.. at least a quasi-contractual relationship between the State and
the investor, whereby the State has purposefully and specifically
induced the investment."30-3 A "mere contract breach, without
something further" is "normally" not enough. 30 4 Likewise, "not
living up to expectations cannot be sufficient to find a breach
.... Instead, Article 1105(1) requires the evaluation of whether
the State made any specific assurance or commitment to the
investor so as to induce its expectations. '" 30 5 The tribunal asks
"whether Claimant's reasonable expectations may have been
induced by ... specific assurances. '" 306
301. See id. 828 ("[A]ddressing the record as a whole, the Tribunal holds that
Claimant has not established that the acts complained of fall short of the customary
international law minimum standard of treatment. The complained-of acts were not
egregious and shocking . .
302. Id. 799.
303. Id. 766.
304. Id. 620.
305. Id
306. Id. 1 800.
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1. Glamis's Expectations-Based Article 1105 Standard and Its
Origins in Takings Law
The tribunal employs a standard comprised of a two-part
inquiry. As a threshold matter, the claimant must first establish
RIBEs. 30 7 This "prerequisite to any breach of Article 1105 by
repudiation of investor expectations"3-0 8 requires an objective
assessment as to whether a reasonable investor would have
formed expectations based on government conduct.30 9 Only if
RIBEs are found will the tribunal proceed to the second,
subjective question of whether the government repudiated
assurances received by the claimant. In articulating this article
1105 expectations standard, Glamis draws from takings law.
Objectively reasonable investor expectations are from Fifth
Amendment precedent,310  and "specific assurances" from
NAFTA article 1110 jurisprudence.311 However, Glamis's "specific
assurances" approach does not subjectively evaluate the
interaction between claimant and defending government as in
prior article 1110 awards.312 Rather, the expectations-based
307. See id. 766.
308. Id. 802.
309. See id. I 621, 627 (framing inquiry in terms of "objective expectations"
created by the state "in order to induce investment").
310. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Penn Central
Transportation Corp. v. New York City 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978)). Glamis is not the first
NAFTA tribunal to reference reasonable, investment-backed expectations. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/1 ARB (AF)/02/
1, Award, I 176(c), (k) (NAFTA Arb. Trib. July 17, 2006), available at
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Mexico/Fireman/
FiremansFund-Mexico-FinalAward.pdf (finding the term to describe factor for
evaluating violations of NAFTA article 1110).
311. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
312. In their "specific assurances" analyses, both Methanex and Feldman focus on
the interaction between the host government and the particular claimant, as opposed to
the creation of objectively reasonable expectations. Methanex Corp. v. United States,
Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, 44 I.L.M. 1345, pt. IV, ch. D 7 (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/51052.pdf
("[A] foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable
unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating government to the then
putative investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from
such regulation."); Feldman v. United Mexican States, Feldman v. United Mexican
States, Award, 42 I.L.M. 625, 146, 148 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2002), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16639.pdf (distinguishing Metalclad, in
which claimant itself "had relied on the representations of the Mexican federal
government," focusing on "[t] he assurances received by the investor" without reference
to an objectively reasonable investor).
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article 1105 standard that Glamis articulates focuses initially on an
objectively reasonable investor and moves the subjective inquiry
to the subsequent determination of whether repudiation
occurred.
Glamis curiously conflates its article 1105 expectations
analysis with previous awards assessing investor expectations
under article 1110. The tribunal relies on the Methanex rejection
of takings liability as support for the proposition that article 1105
asks "whether Claimant's reasonable expectations may have been
induced by... specific assurances. '"3 13 In its "fair and equitable
treatment" analysis, Glamis references the takings discussion from
Metalclad and another NAITA chapter 11 award, concluding
without explanation that the takings expectations inquiry
presents a lower standard than does article 1105.314 While this
statement indicates that RIBEs are more easily established for a
taking, without clarifying the comparison, Glamis injects
perplexity as to how the protections differ from one another. By
transposing the article 1110 reasoning of previous awards and
combining that standard with RIBEs, Glamis engenders
uncertainty as to the expectations-based article 1105 standard
that it fashions.
Despite confusingly melding takings concepts from U.S. and
NAFTA jurisprudence, Glamis appropriately recognizes
expectation protection as a component of "fair and equitable
treatment." Host governments are understood as acting unfairly
and inequitably when they repudiate certain actions that induce
foreign investment. Moreover, expectation protection is better
evaluated under "fair and equitable treatment" than takings
because of the wide discretion that tribunals have in awarding
damages for violations; 315 the expropriation remedy of "fair
market value" may not be function as appropriate relief in all
circumstances where an investor proves that its host government
unfairly reneged. 316 Therefore, notwithstanding its awkward
pairing of RIBEs with a reformulated "specific assurances"
standard, Glamis positively advances the customary international
313. Glamis, Award, 620 n.1266.
314. Id. 1 802 (citing Feldman, Award, 148).
315. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
316. See NAIFA, supra note 64, art. 1110(2).
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law of "fair and equitable treatment" protection for foreign
investors.
2. Glamis Lacked the Reasonable Expectations Necessary to
Violate Article 1105
The tribunal found that Glamis lacked the requisite RIBEs
for either the United States or California to have denied "fair
and equitable treatment." Because Glamis failed to establish
sufficient evidence of governmental actions that would have
legitimately created such an expectation, the tribunal took no
position "on the type or nature of repudiation measures that
would be necessary to violate international obligations." '317 Glamis
consequently did not need to address the second prong of the
inquiry.318 The heavily regulated nature of the subject industry
factored against the creation of RIBEs; "Claimant was operating
in a climate that was becoming more and more sensitive to the
environmental consequences of open-pit mining."319 The
tribunal rejected the Leshy Opinion and 2001 permit denial as
bases for violating article 1105:
[T]he federal government did not make specific
commitments to induce Claimant to persevere with its
mining claims. It did not guarantee Claimant approval of its
claims, nor did it offer Claimant any benefit to pursuing such
claims beyond the customary chance to exploit federal land
for possible profit. There did not exist, therefore, the quasi-
contractual inducement that the Tribunal has found is a
prerequisite for consideration of a breach of Article 1105(1)
based upon repudiated investor expectations. 320
The California measures likewise did not constitute an
expectations-based violation of article 1105. Glamis concluded
that while SB 22 "may have surprised Claimant, no specific
assurances were provided to Claimant by the State of California
so as to create a duty on behalf of the State to not upset
317. Glamis, Award, 627 n.1278.
318. See id.; see also id. 622 ("[T]he Tribunal determines below that no specific
assurances were made to induce Claimant's 'reasonable and justifiable expectations,'
[and therefore] the Tribunal need not determine the level, or characteristics, of state
action in contradiction of those expectations that would be necessary to constitute a
violation of Article 1105.").
319. Id. 1 767.
320. Id.
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Claimant's reasonable expectations." 32' Similarly, with respect to
the SMGB regulations, "[t]he Tribunal does not doubt that this
imposition of mandatory backfilling surprised Claimant and
upset its expectations. '" 322 Glamis, however, once more declined
to find a violation, explaining its narrow task and elaborating on
the standard:
The inquiry as to whether the California's requirement of
mandatory backfilling repudiates Claimant's reasonable,
investment-backed expectations turns again on the threshold
inquiry of whether or not there were specific assurances from
the State of California that it would not enact such a
regulation.
Whether these expectations were reasonable or not is not an
inquiry that the Tribunal need make, however. The inquiry
... is solely whether California, or the federal government,
made specific assurances to Claimant that such that a
requirement would not be instituted in order to induce
Claimant's investment in the Imperial Project....
Respondent has presented a prima facie showing that no
such specific assurances were given to Claimant and
Claimant has failed to rebut this showing. As no duty of the
State was thus created ensuring maintenance of Claimant's
reasonable expectations, the Tribunal also need not address
what level of repudiation of this duty would be required to
find such an act a violation of State obligations under Article
1105.323
The tribunal provides insight into the "specific assurances"
necessary to prevail under its expectations-based article 1105
standard. Glamis claimed such assurances based on the federal
CDPA designating areas in the California desert as wilderness-
not including the proposed Imperial Project site-and explicitly
stating that there were "no buffer zones."3 24 The tribunal rejected
this position and explained why the CDPA fell short of creating
the requisite specific assurances:
321. Id. 1807.
322. Id. 1 810.
323. Id. 11 809, 811.
324. See Memorial of Claimant Glamis Gold Ltd., Glamis, 1 262 (May 5, 2006); see
also CDPA, supra note 14, § 103(d).
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The "no buffer zone" language cited by Claimant is not a
specific inducement of investment in mineral exploration
and exploitation.... It makes no assurance that such
activities will not be regulated for other reasons, irrespective
of their impact on wilderness areas.
In addition, this is not the type of specific inducement
necessary to create the duty that is a prerequisite to any
breach of Article 1105 by repudiation of investor
expectations. The asserted assurances made to Claimant are
not equivalent to the assurances in Metalclad, which were
found to be "definitive, unambiguous and repeated" and
thus were sufficient to create the threshold State
obligation. 325
The tribunal did not address Glamis's other argument that it
had received oral specific assurances from DOI. Glamis's top
executive testified that a BLM official "looked [him] in the eyes"
and said the permit would be forthcoming.326 The tribunal's
disregard of this statement demonstrates that it is not "the active
inducement of a quasi-contractual expectation" necessary to
assure a reasonable investor.327 The statement was allegedly made
during the permitting process that subsequently changed course
upon disclosure of adverse environmental impacts. Oral
expressions of one government official before a permit is issued,
such as that argued by Glamis and ignored by the tribunal, are
doubtful to form the requisite objective expectations. As 2002
drew to a close, Glamis was close to obtaining a permit from the
federal government for its POO.328 This would have enabled the
tribunal to reach the second prong of its expectations-based
article 1105 standard: whether the California measures
constituted a repudiation of the specific assurances embodied in
the federal permit.329
325. Glamis, Award, 801-02.
326. Transcript of Hearing on the Merits, Glamis, at 178 (Sept. 12, 2007),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/93408.pdf; see also Glamis, Award, 1
636-37 (referencing this argument in setting forth Glamis's position, although failing to
subsequently address this argument in the article 1105 reasoning).
327. Glamis, Award, 799.
328. See id. 165.
329. See id. 622 n.1280.
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3. Glamis Emphasizes Permit Issuance in Accordance With
Metalclad and Methanex
The tribunal's focus on the term "quasi-contract" indicates
that permit issuance establishes the RIBEs necessary to support
an article 1105 claim. 330 Once a permit is obtained, the claimant
has objectively reasonable expectations to proceed with its
investment and protection against future repudiation. Glamis
casts doubt that action short of permit issuance will violate article
1105: "Assuming there was no quasi-contractual relationship, the
Tribunal finds that a claimant cannot have a legitimate
expectation that the host country will not pass legislation that will
affect it."331 Future NAFTA awards can be expected to further
develop this expectations-based article 1105 doctrine; claimants
will be best positioned for damages if they have at least one
permit coupled with government acts that can be described as
repudiating their RIBEs.
Glamis builds on Methanex and leaves Metalclad intact. The
Metalclad claimant had a federal permit prior to the repudiation
by political subdivisions that violated article 1105.332 Methanex
distinguished Metalclad, and held that the heightening of
requirements in a highly regulated industry will not violate
NAFTA. 333 Glamis echoes this result but modifies the inquiry by
rejecting the expectations-based "fair and equitable treatment"
challenge where the claimant lacked RIBEs that it could proceed
with the investment induced by "specific assurances" of its host
government. 334 Notwithstanding the imprecision of the Glamis
article 1105 expectations analysis that is likely to engender
330. See id. 1 24, 766-67, 799, 812-13.
331. Id. 7813.
332. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award, 40 I.L.M. 36, 7 74-101
(NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2000), available at http://www.economia-snci.gob.mx/sphp-pages/
importa/sol_contro/consultoria/casos-mexico/metalclad/laudo/laudoingles.pdf.
333. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award, 44 I.L.M. 1345, pt. IV, ch. D
7 9 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/51052.pdf ("Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely
known, if not notorious, that government environmental and health protection
institutions at the federal and state level, operating under the vigilant eyes of the media,
interested corporations, non-governmental organizations and a politically active
electorate, continuously monitored the use and impact or chemical compounds and
commonly prohibited or restricted the use of some of those compounds for
environmental and/or health reasons.").
334. See Glamis, Award, 77 799-800.
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confusion, protection against the repudiation of "specific
assurances" embodied in a permit is now solidified as a key
component of NAFTAjurisprudence.
D. Glamis Disingenuously Equates Article 1105 with Neer
Glamis's equation of article 1105 with the 1926 Neer standard
is not genuine. Neer requires that government actions "amount to
an outrage, to bad faith, to willful neglect of duty, or to an
insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international
standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily
recognize its insufficiency. '" 3 5 The tribunal acknowledged that
customary international law now can be violated through actions
falling short of this 1926 standard by explaining that Neer
violations are to be evaluated in the modern context.3 36 The
specified types of government action deemed violations in
Glamis's character-based article 1105 standard are plausibly
"shocking" or "egregious" today despite not being so when Neer
was decided. However, these characterizations are better
classified as a separate standard than a modern variation on Neer.
Tellingly, although "bad faith" is a central component of the Neer
standard, 337 Glamis deemphasizes its role by explaining that "a
finding of bad faith is not a requirement for a breach of Article
1105(1). "338
The tribunal's expectations-based article 1105 standard is
especially removed from Neer. The resultant protection against
government repudiating RIBEs-based specific assurances
represents a unique standard. Strands of takings law are woven
together to comprise a basis for violating article 1105 that does
not resemble Neer. It is disingenuous to equate this standard with
"shocking" or "outrageous" behavior, whether the conduct is
judged by 1926 or modern sensibilities. While Glamis
335. Neer v. United Mexican States, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 60 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n (U.S.-Mex.) 1926).
336. See Glamis, Award, J 613, 616.
337. The Neer standard lists the following types of "governmental acts" that
constitute violations: (1) "outrage"; (2) "bad faith"; (3) "willful neglect of duty"; or (4)
"an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of international standards that
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency." Neer, 4 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards at 60. However, these categories either require "bad faith" or an
equally malfeasant government act.
338. Glamis, Award, 627.
2009]
154 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 33:101
commendably recognizes expectation protection as a feature of
article 1105, its view that the combination of language from U.S.
and NAFTA takings jurisprudence equates with Neer is
preposterous.
E. Glamis's "Fair and Equitable Treatment" Promotes Foreign Direct
Investment
Despite its sophistry, the tribunal's article 1105 is a positive
development that will promote foreign direct investment. 339 Its
artificial construct of Neer enables the tribunal to avoid finding
that customary international law has evolved while holding that
article 1105 affords protection against government conduct that
is now universally understood to be unfair. The character-based
article 1105 standard guarantees investor protection against the
list of malfeasant types of government actions. If the treatment
received by a foreign investor can be so characterized, its host
state will be liable. The standard is exceptionally high, but
nevertheless gives foreign investors confidence that extreme
government misconduct will not be tolerated under customary
international law-that is, in the absence of any particular
agreement. Moreover, the tribunal's focus on intergovernmental
collusion informs foreign investors of a factual predicate that will
increase the likelihood of a "fair and equitable treatment"
violation. By giving future claimants this clue and finding that
protection against specified unfair government action is a part of
custom, Glamis's character-based article 1105 standard will
promote foreign direct investment.
Glamis, notwithstanding its Neer charade, advances
international law in favor of investor protection. The tribunal
sends a strong signal that customary norms do not tolerate
government repudiation of RIBEs formed by specific assurances
to induce investment. Although the contours of this standard will
be refined in the future, it is now apparent that if a permit issued
by a federal government is subsequently repudiated, liability will
accrue. Despite its spurious underpinnings, Glamis's
expectations-based article 1105 standard will engender foreign
339. "Foreign direct investment" refers to investment that is owned by nationals of
a different state than the state where the investment is located. See generally Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD), OECD Benchmark Definition of
Foreign Direct Investment, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf.
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direct investment. Those contemplating direct investment abroad
can take comfort that legal recourse is available in the event that
a permit is reneged upon. This enhancement of investment is not
limited to North America and its minimal "fair and equitable
treatment" guarantee; given the tribunal's finding that this
protection is a part of customary international law,340 Glamis will
stimulate foreign investment worldwide.
CONCLUSION
Glamis is the gold standard for investor-state arbitration.
Future proceedings should model themselves after its
commendably transparent process that accommodated interested
non-parties, particularly the Quechan Tribe. Its article 1110
reasoning confirms that NAFTA takings claimants have
procedural advantages over U.S. litigants, but any disadvantage to
government is more than offset by the substantive takings
approach. Glamis employs an "inverse-Lucas" framework that
denies compensation after considering only economic impact.
Because this analysis avoids considering unnecessary factors and
maximizes the ability of government to regulate, it should be
adopted worldwide. Glamis articulates two inquiries under article
1105: an assessment of whether the government action can be
characterized as specified types of malfeasance, and an
expectations evaluation that asks whether government reneged
upon RIBEs-based specific assurances. Despite disingenuously
equating these standards with Neer, the tribunal positively
promotes foreign direct investment. The character aspect
enshrines as custom protection against government conduct
deemed universally unacceptable and emphasizes
intergovernmental collusion. The expectations approach is
confusing but solidifies permit repudiation as a basis for liability.
Glamis's analyses, while subject to future refinement, are golden
contributions to international law.
340. See Glamis, Award, 620-21, 627, 799-800.
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